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INTRODUCTION

O

ver the last few decades, the lexicon of European constitutional scholars has apparently changed. If the interests
of European Union law scholars could be gauged through Twitter, a trending topic would likely be: #identity.1 It is difficult to
explain this development, yet this new trend is unsurprising
for a number of reasons. Europe is a small continent: the
smallest continent in fact. However, no other corner of the
1. In 2005, it was noted that “[t]o protect national sovereignty is passé: to
protect national identity by insisting on constitutional specificity is à la
mode.” J. H. H. Weiler, On the power of the Word: Europe’s Constitutional
Iconography, 3 INT’L J. CONST. L. 173, 184 (2005).
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planet bears such an intensity of difference and contrast.2
Compared with the rest of the world, part of Europe’s character
is the richness brought by the many different languages spoken
and many histories and traditions in an area of only half a million square kilometers.3
Against such a background of differences and contrasts, the
history of both the EU and its neighboring regions not surprisingly experienced a rise of identity claims over the last two
decades. It is no coincidence that the last remaining multiethnic states in the region—Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and the
USSR—disappeared during the 1990s to make room for more
nationally homogeneous entities. The 1990s were ripe with
multiple claims to national identity, and the EU was no exception to this trend.4 In 1992, in line with this trend, the principle
of respect of Member States’ “national identities” made it into
the Maastricht Treaty.5
The increase of identity claims over the last two decades has
been a matter of theoretical speculation. With the Euro Crisis,
identity claims have changed from being matters of theory to
matters of practice. At the present, Europe seems to be sitting
on a ticking time bomb—loaded with identity claims—and this
issue is no longer purely theoretical, but rather is manifested
in issues that include: are Eurobonds compatible with the
German constitutional identity?; Is the Republic of Ireland en2. These considerations open the formidable history of postwar Europe.
TONY JUDT, POSTWAR: A HISTORY OF EUROPE SINCE 1945 (2006).
3. The territory of the EU is smaller than Brazil or Australia, less than
half the size of China, and equivalent to only a fraction of Russia.
4. JUDT, supra note 2, at 637–38. One should say that not all these States
were multiethnic (Czechoslovakia was a multinational not a multiethnic
State), and even if every single dissolution had its own development, the territorial fission of the late nineties was in line with the ethnic “simplification”
of the European map.
5. In 1992, a national Identity Clause was first inserted in the Treaty of
Maastricht. Treaty on European Union (Maastricht text), July 29, 1992, 1992
O.J. (C 191) 1 [hereinafter Treaty of Maastricht]. Article F (1) TEU constitutionalized such obligation by plainly stressing that “the Union shall respect
the national identities of its Member States.” Article F (1) TEU of the Maastricht Treaty was later replaced by Article 6 (3) TEU of the Amsterdam Treaty, Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties Establishing the European Communities and Certain Related Acts, 1997,
O.J. (C 340) 1 [hereinafter Treaty of Amsterdam], in 1997, which then gave
way to Article 4(2) TEU of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, currently in force, Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union art. 4(2), 2010 O.J. (C 83).
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titled to prohibit the medical practice of terminating pregnancies, and/or to restrict the provision or advertising of this medical service when the procedure can be carried out in another
Member State?; Are the family rights of a same-sex couple, validly married in France, to be recognized in the Polish legal order? This article does not address substantive questions such
as these, which relate to identity issues. However, this article
attempts to address the precursory question of which actor is
best placed to answer these crucial questions. Is it the Court of
Justice of the European Union (CJEU) that should decide identity issues? Or should the constitutional and Supreme Courts of
Member States be entitled to the final word on the subject?
This article argues that it should be neither.
Elements of the judicial understanding of constitutional identity will be collected in Part I. In Part II, an analysis of methods of nonjudicial neutralization of identity-related conflicts
will be undertaken. Part III analyzes three possible indicators
of constitutional identity-sensitive matters: a) national interests underpinning the nonparticipation of certain Member
States in enhanced cooperation agreements; b) matters where
the unanimity rule still applies; and c) references to constitutional identity in national Parliaments’ reasoned opinions.
In conclusion, these fragments of the constitutional-identity
patchwork will be put together, and a surprisingly coherent
framework will emerge. By comparing the list of constitutional
identity-sensitive matters that the German Bundesverfassungsgericht (“BVerfG”) compiled in its Lissabon-Urteil with
the substantive matters involved in the illustrated opt-outs,
exemptions, and protocols, remarkable overlaps emerge. Member States and the EU are struggling widely with the same
matters both in and out of European and national constitutional courts. Among highly considered national interests, many
elements recur. This article will argue that empirical evidence
shows that differentiated integration and flexibility are already
being used as nonjudicial tools to respect (or rather, to neutralize future infringements of) national constitutional identities.
This pragmatic and flexible application has stemmed from an
acute need to differentiate in an expanding EU. On the basis of
this pragmatic approach, this article will argue for an interpretation of Article 4(2) of the Treaty on the European Union
(TEU) that demands a legal obligation to use a wide range of
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differentiated integration for the purpose of respecting national
constitutional identities.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL IDENTITY IN THE COURTS: AN OVERVIEW
In Part I, this article will question the judicial monopoly over
the national constitutional identity that has emerged in the
development of the European integration process in recent decades. To do so, the article will begin by analyzing the notion of
national constitutional identity from a court-centric perspective. First, the article will identify a conceptual ambiguity, digging into the ambivalent use of the terms “national” and “constitutional” identity. Next, the article will provide a brief overview of the meaning of “constitutional identity” found in case
law relating to European integration, in particular, some highly influential decisions of constitutional courts. The article will
then focus on some early decisions of the CJEU, where Article
4(2) of the TEU was in play, and go on to consider the analysis
on the Identity Clause in Advocate Generals’ (“AG”) opinions.
On the basis of this case law, the article will argue that national constitutional identity remains an extremely vague concept.
This article then argues that the indeterminacy of the concept
of national constitutional identity in Article 4(2) TEU may not
be a flaw within the provision but one of its most resourceful
aspects. The article will then elaborate on the interpretation of
this notion, moving away from the courts in Part II.
A. Article 4(2) TEU: National or Constitutional Identity?
The TEU refers to “national identity.” So, why are the shelves
of law libraries weighed down by massive amounts of literature
on “constitutional identity”? In short, the interpretation of the
notion of “national identity” has gradually shifted toward a legal approach, moving away from a historical or sociological
one.6 This move has been partly supported, if not caused, by
the amendment of the TEU formulation with the adoption of

6. Legal scholars arrived relatively late in approaching this trending topic, following other social sciences where an interest in nations and nationalism studies came to the forefront some years earlier. See, e.g., LUTZ
NIETHAMMER,
KOLLEKTIVE IDENTITÄT. HEIMLICHE QUELLEN EINER
UNHEIMLICHEN KONJUNKTUR (2000). On the delay of the legal scholarship, see
ELKE CLOOTS, NATIONAL IDENTITY IN EU LAW (2015).
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the Lisbon Treaty.7 Nevertheless, a literal interpretation seems
inadequate, considering the fact that a crucial element such as
the singular or plural conjugation of the term “identity” varies
in the TEU’s various translations.8
Although the concept of identity has always been subject to
ambiguities and interpretative uncertainties, the connection
between national and constitutional identity has gradually
been taken as a self-evident truth.9 However, it seems necessary to devote some attention to this inherent connection.10 The
Maastricht Treaty represented a sort of watershed moment in
the legal evolution of identity in the EU. On one hand, the trea7. The Maastricht Treaty’s wording narrowly provided that “the Union
shall respect the national identities of its Member States, whose systems of
government are founded on the principles of democracy.” Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union art. 6(2), May 9, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C115)
13 [hereinafter TEU]. The Treaty of Lisbon added that the Union shall respect the equality of the Member States as well as their national identities
inherent in their fundamental structures, political and constitutional, inclusive of regional and local self-government. It shall respect
their essential State functions, including ensuring the territorial integrity of the State, maintaining law and order and safeguarding national security. In particular, national security remains the sole responsibility of each Member State.
Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty
Establishing the European Community art. 3a, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C
306) 1 [hereinafter Treaty of Lisbon].
8. In English, the Treaty stated that the Union shall respect national
identities, whereas in Italian “L’Unione rispetta l’identità nazionale,” in German “Die Union achtet die nationale Identität,” in French “L’Union respecte
l’identité nationale,” and in Polish “Unia szanuje tożsamość narodową.”
9. On this point, an efficient summary is found in a relatively recent AG’s
opinion: “I would make it clear that the position which I propose that the
Court should adopt in the present case does not mean that account is not to
be taken of the national identity of the Member States, of which constitutional identity certainly forms a part.” Opinion of Advocate General Bot, Case C399/11, Criminal Proceedings Against Stefano Melloni, ECLI:EU:C:2012:600,
¶ 137 (E.C.J.).
10. On understanding of national identity as constitutional identity, see
Roberto Toniatti, Sovereignty Lost, Constitutional Identity Regained, in
NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL IDENTITY AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 49, 49, 63,
67 (Alejandro Saiz Arnaiz & Carina Alcoberro Llivinia eds., 2013); Leonard F.
M. Besselink, National and Constitutional Identity Before and After Lisbon, 6
UTRECHT L. REV. 36, 42–44 (2010). Contra MICHEL ROSENFELD, THE IDENTITY
OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL SUBJECT: SELFHOOD, CITIZENSHIP, CULTURE, AND
COMMUNITY 29 (2009); CLOOTS, supra note 6, at 167–68.
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ty took important steps in the way of an ever closer EU with
the introduction of a European citizenship, a deeper economic
and a monetary Union, and an ever closer political Union.
These were steps that were able to challenge the traditional
role of the nation State. On the other hand, the fear of a supranational entity overwhelming individual nation States was
tempered by the introduction of principles aimed at safeguarding Member States,11 such as the principle of respect for national identities.12
In the EU, the process of balancing between new national
claims and integrationist forces continues in the successive
amendments of the Treaties,13 through some minor changes in
the formulation of the principle of protection of national identities, and above all, through the introduction of the subsidiarity
principle.14 If the Treaty of Maastricht brought vast attention
to the concept of national identity, the Lisbon Treaty was a
successive landmark in the evolution of the identity literature.
11. On the counterbalancing effect of the Identity Clause with respect to
“on-going constitutionalization of the EU,” see Monica Claes, National Identity: Trump Card or Up for Negotiation?, in NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL
IDENTITY AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 109, 118 (Alejandro Saiz Arnaiz & Carina Alcoberro Llivinia eds., 2013). See also CLOOTS, supra note 6, at 63, 82,
179, 184.
12. TEU, supra note 7, art. F. The first provision in a European Treaty
that explicitly mentioned national identity: “the Union shall respect the national identities of its Member States, whose system of government are
founded on the principles of democracy.” Id.
13. The treaty of Amsterdam reformulated the principles, splitting the
democratic principle and the protection of national identities. Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties Establishing
the European Communities and Certain Related Acts art. 1(8), Oct. 2, 1997,
1997 O.J. (C340) 1 [hereinafter Treaty of Amsterdam]. The democratic principle was formulated in a separated paragraph, as a fundamental principle
both of the Member States and the Union: “The Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, principles which are common to the Member
States.” Id. The obligation of the Union to respect the national identities was
formulated in the third paragraph of the same article: “The Union shall respect the national identities of its Member States.” Id.
14. On the role of the subsidiarity principle (beside the dismantled pillar
system and the “variable geometry” approach of closer cooperation) in these
conflicts between European and national sovereignty claims, see Peter L.
Lindseth, Democratic Legitimacy and the Administrative Character of Supranationalism: The Example of the European Community, 99 COLUM. L. REV.
628, 668 (1999).
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Article 4(2) was the first EU-Treaty provision to codify national
constitutional identity, through a reformulation of the Identity
Clause, which was largely drawing from the text of the ill-fated
Constitutional Treaty (“CT”).15 For the first time, the wording
shifted from the purely national qualification of identity to a
much wider one. National identity is now inherent in Member
States’ “fundamental structures, political and constitutional,
inclusive of regional and local self-government.”16 Among the
innovations of the Treaty of Lisbon in the field of identity, one
should mention the preamble of the Charter of Fundamental
Rights of the European Union (CFREU), establishing the obligation to respect the “national identities of the Member States
and the organisation of their public authorities at national, regional and local levels.”17 Against this background, it was quite
clear that the concept of national identity consisted not only of
a mere historical or sociological reference, but on the contrary,
bore a legal meaning and more precisely, a constitutional one.18
It comes as no surprise that this constitutionalization of the
concept of identity triggered an even deeper involvement of the
constitutional courts in many Member States. When the Treaty
of Maastricht was adopted, there had already been a number of
judgments on the matter. Nonetheless, the outbreak of such
15. The Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, which was approved in 2004, but never ratified by the necessary majority of Member
States, stated that
[t]he union shall respect the equality of Member States before the
constitution as well as their national identities, inherent in their
fundamental structures, political and constitutional, inclusive of regional and local self-government. It shall respect their essential
State functions, including ensuring the territorial integrity of the
State, maintaining law and order and safeguarding national security.
Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, 2004 O.J. (C 310) 1 (never
ratified).
16. Treaty of Lisbon art. 3a.
17. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union pmbl., 2010
O.J. (C 83) 02, at 391.
18. The reference to fundamental political and constitutional structures
“distances the notion of national identity in Article 4(2) TEU from cultural,
historical or linguistic criteria and turns to the content of domestic constitutional orders.” Armin von Bogdandy & Stephan Schill, Overcoming Absolute
Primacy: Respect for National Identity Under the Lisbon Treaty, 48 COMMON
MKT. L. REV. 1417, 1422 (2011).
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judgments on the matter of constitutional identity after Maastricht and above all after Lisbon has been remarkable.
One could argue that these decisions have nothing to do with
either Article 4(2) TEU or the autonomous notion of national
identity in EU law. As a matter of fact, the Treaty’s wording
does not refer to constitutional identity but to national identity,
and a literal understanding of the Identity Clause does not allow any correspondence with the domestic notion of constitutional identity. Accordingly, one should interpret the legal
meaning of “nation” to determine the authentic understanding
of the Identity Clause in Article 4(2) TEU. However, this reasoning would not lead very far: the very concept of “nation” is
highly controversial as well as subject to ambiguities, vagueness, and indeterminacy. There are at least two radically different understandings of this notion in the last two centuries of
legal thought. According to an ethnic-centered reading of “nation,” the concept is related to the existence of common elements in a community: language, history, customs, and ethnicity. In contrast to this view, the civic conception of “nation”
identifies the notion with a subjective sense of belonging to a
community, based on very different elements, such as citizenship, law, culture, and religion. Additionally, a narrow interpretation of the concept of “national identity” would not be able
to embrace the reality of the many multinational Member
States in the EU.19 In particular, if the singular definition of
“national identity” would be taken into consideration under
this narrow interpretation, what about the Member States
comprising multinational identities? A “pure national” interpretation of the notion of “national identity” would lead to a
complex legal puzzle.20
As a matter of fact, communal understanding of the proper
meaning of “nation” greatly varies and, most importantly, “the
content of what constitutes national identity . . . is determined
by reference to domestic constitutional law,”21 which brings us
back to the broader notion of “national constitutional identity.”

19. Besselink, supra note 10, at 42–43.
20. CLOOTS, supra note 6, at 151–54.
21. von Bogdandy & Schill, supra note 18, at 1429.
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B. A Court-Centered Canon
Article 4(2) TEU is frequently described as a “Europeanized
counter-limit,”22 consisting of a binding obligation for the EU to
respect national constitutional identities. The interpretation of
the extension and implications of this obligation as a matter of
positive law is crucial with respect to two of the most fundamental principles of the European constitutional order, namely
primacy and uniform application of EU law. Therefore, it is not
surprising that vast attention has been devoted to the judicial
interpretation of the legal meaning and scope of the abovementioned provision.
The Identity Clause has been seen as a twofold “invitation to
struggle”23 involving its interpretation and the definition of the
competent authority in charge of that interpretation.24 Invited
or not, national and supranational courts struggle with these
issues.
A court-centered interpretative canon of the Identity Clause
supports an “exceptionalist understanding”25 of Article 4(2)
TEU. The identity argument has been seen as a last resort “to
only apply in exceptional cases of conflict between EU law and
domestic constitutional law.”26 This is certainly true as far as
22. GUISEPPE MARTINICO, THE TANGLED COMPLEXITY OF THE EU
CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS: THE FRUSTRATING KNOT OF EUROPE 93 (2012);
Antonio Ruggeri, “Tradizioni costituzionali comuni” e “controlimiti,” tra teoria
delle fonti e teoria dell’ interpretazione, in DIRRITO PUBLICO COMP. ED
EUROPEO 102 (2003). According to Dobbs, “the conflict is no longer technically
between national and EU law, but between aspects of EU law.” Mary Dobbs,
Sovereignty, Article 4(2) TEU and the Respect of National Identities: Swinging the Balance in Favour of the Member States?, 33 Y.B. EUR. L. 298, 325
(2014).
23. An “invitation to struggle” for the direction of foreign and security policy is the image used by Corwin to describe the U.S. Constitution and its distribution of powers between the President and Congress. EDWARD S. CORWIN,
THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS 177 (5th ed. 1984).
24. Mattias Kumm, The Jurisprudence of Constitutional Conflict: Constitutional Supremacy in Europe before and after the Constitutional Treaty, 11
EUR. L.J. 262 (2005); Toniatti, supra note 10.
25. The term “exceptionalist understanding” is drawn from Barbara
Guastaferro, Beyond the Exceptionalism of Constitutional Conflicts: The Ordinary Functions of the Identity Clause (Jean Monnet Ctr. for Int’l & Regional
Econ.
Law
&
Justice,
Working
Paper
No.
01/12,
2012),
http://jeanmonnetprogram.org/wpcontent/uploads/2014/12/JMWP01Guastaferro.pdf.
26. von Bogdandy & Schill, supra note 18, at 1431.
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the judicial use of national constitutional identity is concerned.
As a matter of fact, consequences of the application of Article
4(2) TEU to justify a relativization of EU law’s primacy are difficult to predict and preferable to avoid.
C. National Constitutional Identity in the Case Law of the
Member States’ Constitutional Courts
The first judgment where a national court theorized domestic
constitutional reservations to the primacy of EU law is the
Frontini Judgment27 of the Italian Constitutional Court. However, it is important to note that the counterlimits case law of
the German BVerfG played a major role in this matter.28
The example and model of the German BVerfG counterlimits
doctrine has been subject to a quick evolution. The counterlimits doctrine initially consisted of a human rights proviso,
then turned into an ultra vires test, and finally into a constitutional identity test.29 The (in)famous role of the BVerfG as a
stringent watchdog of the State-centered constitutional model
was inaugurated with the Solange I judgment in 1974, and
continued through a series of landmark decisions that include
Solange II,30 Maastricht,31 Banana Market Decision,32 Lisbon,33
Mangold-Honeywell,34 four judgments related to the Euro Cri-

27. Corte Cost., 27 dicembre 1973, n. 183, Giur. it. 1973, II, 2401 (It.). The
Italian Constitutional Court did not explicitly make use of the term “identity,” but followed a very similar approach to the Solange saga. Id.
28. This role has been boosted by the “overwhelming academic and political attention on the Bundesverfassungsgericht’s pronouncements on EU law”
and this attention “risks putting the case law of other national constitutional
courts in the shade.” CLOOTS, supra note 6, at 52.
29. Mehrdad Payandeh, Constitutional Review of EU Law After Honeywell:
Contextualizing the Relationship Between the German Constitutional Court
and the EU Court of Justice, 48 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 9, 9 (2011).
30. BVerfG, 2BvR 197/83, Oct. 22, 1986.
31. BVerfG, 2 BvR 2134/92, Oct. 12, 1993.
32. BVerfG,
2
BvL
1/97,
June
7,
2000,
https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/EN/2
000/06/ls20000607_2bvl000197en.html.
33. BVerfG,
2
BvE
2/08,
June
30,
2009,
https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/EN/2
009/06/es20090630_2bve000208en.html.
34. BVerfG,
2
BvR
2661/06,
July
6,
2010,
https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/EN/2
010/07/rs20100706_2bvr266106en.html.
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sis,35 and OMT,36 which are vastly commented on in constitutional and EU-law literature. Assessing this case law in detail
would take us too far from the focus of this article. Briefly, with
regard to this German “obsession,”37 what is notable is that the
BVerfG played a crucial role in interpreting the issues related
with national constitutional identities.
The BVerfG model implies that constitutional identity consists of a core that is not subject to any modification. This constitutional core sets a limit to European integration that not
even a constitutional amendment can remove. The content of
this core is enshrined in the so called “Eternity Clause” in accordance with Article 79.3 Grundgesetz (“German Basic Law”
or “GG”),38 which was extended to the European matters pursuant to Article 23 GG and further interpreted by the BVerfG
itself.39 Hence, within the constitutional core, the Eternity
Clause includes the principle of democracy, the essence of
which exists in the constitutional voting rights of German citi35. The German BVerfG pronounced four landmark judgments on the Euro
Crisis, namely BverfG, 2 BvR 987/10, Sept. 7, 2011,
https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/EN/2
011/09/rs20110907_2bvr098710en.html; BVerfG, 2 BvE 8/11, Feb. 28, 2012,
https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/DE/2
012/02/es20120228_2bve000811.html; BVerfG, 2 BvE 4/11, June 19, 2012,
https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/EN/2
012/06/es20120619_2bve000411en.html; and BVerfG, 2 BvR 1561/12, Jan. 28,
2014, http://www.bverfg.de/e/rs20140128_2bvr156112.html.
36. BverfG,
2
BvR
1390/12,
Dec.
17,
2013,
http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/DE/20
12/09/rs20120912a_2bvr139012.html.
37. The protection of national identity lies in between an “obsession” and a
“serious concern.” Christian Tomuschat, The Defence of National Identity by
the German Constitutional Court, in NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL IDENTITY AND
EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 205, 205 (Alejandro Saiz Arnaiz & Carina Alcoberro
Llivinia eds., 2013).
38. Article 79.3 of the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany (the
“Basic Law”) states, “Amendments to this Basic Law affecting the division of
the Federation into Länder, their participation on principle in the legislative
process, or the principles laid down in Articles 1 and 20 shall be inadmissible.” GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [Basic Law] art. 79.3, translation at
http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_gg/englisch_gg.html#p0409.
39. Article 23 of the Basic Law states, “The establishment of the European
Union, as well as changes in its treaty foundations and comparable regulations that amend or supplement this Basic Law, or make such amendments
or supplements possible, shall be subject to paragraphs (2) and (3) of Article
79.” GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [Basic Law] art. 23.
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zens. Against this background, the BVerfG states that German
Basic Law impedes the conferral of those competences to the
EU that would bear a risk of deprivation of the right to vote
and the principle of democracy of their substantive contents.40
In the view of the BVerfG:
Particularly sensitive for the ability of a constitutional state
to democratically shape itself are decisions on substantive
and formal criminal law (1), on the disposition of the monopoly on the use of force by the police within the state and by the
military towards the exterior (2), fundamental fiscal decisions
on public revenue and public expenditure, the latter being
particularly motivated, inter alia, by social policy considerations (3), decisions on the shaping of living conditions in a social state (4) and decisions of particular cultural importance,
for example on family law, the school and education system
and on dealing with religious communities (5) and the right of
coinage (6)41

This model has proved successful, and was the object of a
wide migration of a persuasive “constitutional idea.”42 As a
matter of fact, the EU-related case law of many Constitutional
and Supreme Courts, such as Poland,43 Hungary,44 and Czech

40. On the BVerfG account,
[t]he principle of democracy as well as the principle of subsidiarity,
which is also structurally required by Article 23.1 first sentence of
the Basic Law, therefore require factually to restrict the transfer and
exercise of sovereign powers to the European Union in a predictable
manner, particularly in central political areas of the space of personal development and the shaping of living conditions by social policy.
BVerfG,
2
BvE
2/08,
June
30,
2009
at
251,
https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/EN/2
009/06/es20090630_2bve000208en.html.
41. Id. at 252. The right of coinage, which has always been a classical state
competence in traditional theoretical models, was not mentioned in the
Court’s list of the hardcore of Member State competences, and the reason for
this omission is quite clear.
42. See generally THE MIGRATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL IDEAS (Sujit
Choudhry ed., Reissue ed. 2011).
43. See Polish Constitutional Tribunal, case K32/09, Judgment of Nov. 24,
2010, http://trybunal.gov.pl/fileadmin/content/omowienia/K_32_09_EN.pdf.
44. See Alkotmánybíróság (AB) [Constitutional Court of Hungary] July 12,
2010, 143/2010 (Hung.).

504

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 41:2

Republic,45 bear resemblances to the BVerfG’s doctrine of constitutional identity. In some cases these resemblances are
made explicit, with open references to the Lissabon Urteil of
the BVerfG.46 This is the case of the Polish Constitutional
Court’s decision on the Treaty of Lisbon, manifestly inspired by
the German model. According to the Constitutional Court’s
view, the constitutional rule concerning the transfer of competences47 protects Poland’s constitutional identity, by excluding
from the transfer the matters that are fundamental for the organization of a State. These are the decisions concerning the
fundamental principles of the constitution, the fundamental
rights, the principle of statehood, the democratic principle, rule
of law, the welfare state, subsidiarity, and the competence to
amend the constitution itself.48
45. See Czech Constitutional Court, Case Pl. ÚS 19/08 [Treaty of Lisbon I],
Nov. 26, 2008, http://www.usoud.cz/en/decisions/20081126-pl-us-1908-treatyof-lisbon-i/; Czech Constitutional Court, case Pl. ÚS 29/09 [Treaty of Lisbon
II], Nov. 3, 2009, http://www.usoud.cz/en/decisions/20091103-pl-us-2909treaty-of-lisbon-ii-1/.
46. See Treaty of Lisbon II, supra note 45, paras. 110, 137.
47. Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej [Constitution] Apr. 2, 1997, art.
90 (Pol.), http://www.sejm.gov.pl/prawo/konst/angielski/kon1.htm. Article 90
of the Polish Constitution does not expressly refer to constitutional identity.
Article 90 states that:
The Republic of Poland may, by virtue of international agreements,
delegate to an international organization or international institution
the competence of organs of State authority in relation to certain
matters.
A statute, granting consent for ratification of an international
agreement referred to in para.1, shall be passed by the Sejm by a
two-thirds majority vote in the presence of at least half of the statutory number of Deputies, and by the Senate by a two-thirds majority
vote in the presence of at least half of the statutory number of Senators.
Granting of consent for ratification of such agreement may also be
passed by a nationwide referendum in accordance with the provisions of Article 125.
Any resolution in respect of the choice of procedure for granting consent to ratification shall be taken by the Sejm by an absolute majority vote taken in the presence of at least half of the statutory number
of Deputies.
48. Case K 32/09, Pol. Const. Trib., Nov. 24, 2010, reprinted in SELECTED
RULINGS OF THE POLISH CONSTITUTIONAL TRIBUNAL CONCERNING THE LAW OF
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Additionally, the Polish Constitutional Court made it clear
that the concept of constitutional identity is an equivalent of, or
at least is very closely related with, the concept of national
identity. The concept also includes the traditions and cultural
heritage of the country, drawing its interpretation not only
from Article 4(2) TEU but also from the preamble of the TEU,
where one of the indicated objectives of the Union is to deepen
the solidarity between the peoples of the Union while respecting their history, culture, and traditions. In this respect, according to the Polish Constitutional Court’s view, “the idea of
confirming one’s national identity in solidarity with other nations, and not against them, constitutes the main axiological
basis of the European Union.”49
Case law from the Hungarian Court also bears resemblance
with the Lissabon-Urteil of the BVerfG, although there are no
explicit references to the judgment of their German colleagues.
In its decision on the compatibility of the act of promulgation of
the Lisbon Treaty with the Constitution, the Hungarian judges
rejected an individual complaint, but affirmed that the Parliament has an obligation to reconcile the commitment derived
from Hungary’s membership in the EU and the observance of
the Constitution.50

THE
EUROPEAN
UNION
(2014–2013),
at
192,
202–03
(2014),
http://trybunal.gov.pl/uploads/media/SiM_LI_EN_calosc.pdf (discussing the
constitutionality of the Lisbon Treaty). The Constitutional Tribunal includes
the following matters in the concept of constitutional identity:

decisions specifying the fundamental principles of the Constitution
and decisions concerning the rights of the individual which determine the identity of the state, including, in particular, the requirement of protection of human dignity and constitutional rights, the
principle of statehood, the principle of democratic governance, the
principle of a state ruled by law, the principle of social justice, the
principle of subsidiarity, as well as the requirement of ensuring better implementation of constitutional values and the prohibition to
confer the power to amend the Constitution and the competence to
determine competences.
Id. (citing KRZYSZTOF WOJTYCZEK, PRZEKAZYWANIE KOMPETENCJI PAŃSTWA
ORGANIZACJOM MIEDZYNARODOWYM 284 (2007)).
49. Case K 32/09, Pol. Const. Trib., Nov. 24, 2010.
50. Alkotmánybíróság (AB) [Constitutional Court of Hungary] July 12,
2010, MK.VII.14 143/2010/698 (Hung.).
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The position of the Czech Constitutional Court is more open
toward European law,51 but has some similarities to the German interpretation. The Court acknowledges the principle of
an EU-conforming interpretation of constitutional law, but in
case of a conflict between EU law and the Czech constitution—
especially its “material core”52—the latter must prevail.53 Unlike the BVerfG, the Czech Court does not consider it possible,
in view of the position that it holds in the constitutional system
of the Czech Republic, to create a catalogue of nontransferrable
powers and authoritatively determine “substantive limits to
the transfer of powers.”54 According to the Czech Court’s view,
this is not the Constitutional Court’s task. Limits to the transfer of powers exist but these “should be left primarily to the legislature to specify.”55 This is due to its being “a priori, a political question, which provides the legislature wide discretion.”56
The gap between the Czech Constitutional Court and the
BVerfG illustrates a crucial point: Both the Czech and German
judicial approach in protecting the national role of the Constitution includes substantive limits to the transfer of power. In
the case of the BVerfG, these limits may be directly interpreted
by the Constitutional Tribunal, entrusted both to write a list of
nontransferable duties and to review the possible violations of
these limits. In the case of the Czech constitutional system, the
mere existence of substantive limits to the transfer of competence is ascertained by the Constitutional Court: the concrete
individuation of these limits is left open to future develop51. For an up-to-date overview of the relationship between the Czech Constitution and EU integration, see generally Lubos Tichy & Tomas Dumbrovsky, The Czech Constitution and EU Integration, in MEMBER STATES’
CONSTITUTIONS AND EU INTEGRATION (Stefan Griller, Monica Claes & Lina
Papadopoulou
eds.,
forthcoming
2016),
manuscript
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2615617.
52. The identification of the “material core” of the Czech Constitution came
to the forefront not only with respect to EU law, but also in the internal forum, with the declaration of the unconstitutionality of a constitutional
amendment. See Treaty of Lisbon I, supra note 45, paras. 110, 120, 196, 197,
208, 215 & 216; cf. Yaniv Roznai, Legisprudence Limitations on Constitutional Amendments? Reflections on The Czech Constitutional Court’s Declaration
of Unconstitutional Constitutional Act, 8 VIENNA J. INT’L CONST. L. 29, 31
(2014).
53. Treaty of Lisbon I, supra note 45, para. 85.
54. Treaty of Lisbon II, supra note 45, para. 110.
55. Id. para. 111.
56. Id.
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ments, where the role of the court cannot be excluded, even
though the Czech Court keeps for itself a higher degree of flexibility.
This approach is clearly in favor of the political process and
gets the Czech Court’s view closer to the French approach than
to the German approach. In the framework of an ex ante review
(Article 54 of the French Constitution), the Conseil Constitutionnel reviewed the compatibility of both the CT and the Treaty of Lisbon with the French Constitution.57 In both cases the
Conseil deemed a constitutional revision necessary in view of
the ratification of the Treaties. In a few words, the Conseil ascertained some constitutional limits in respect to certain provisions of the Treaty, but the nature of the domestic limits is
merely formal.58 In these cases, the Conseil did not declare substantive limits to the development of European integration. Instead, the Conseil deemed necessary the revision of the French
Constitution to admit the entry into force of certain new provisions of the Treaties, such as the conferral of new competences
to the EU, the introduction of supranational modes of decision
making, the introduction of the general bridge clause in accordance with Article 48.7 TEU, and with the new powers conferred to national Parliaments under EU law.59 The discussion
shifted back to the political spectrum, and the Parliament
promptly reacted with the necessary constitutional amendments.
The French path may be seen as the opposite and alternative
model to the German BVerfG position.60 Unlike the German

57. See Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Council] decision No.
2004-505 DC Nov. 19, 2004, Rec. 173 (Fr.) (discussing the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe); Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional
Council] decision No. 2007-560 DC Rec. 459 (Fr.) [hereinafter Dècision 2007]
(discussing the Treaty of Lisbon).
58. See
generally
JEAN-PHILIPPE
DEROSIER,
LES
LIMITES
CONSTITUTIONNELLES À L’INTÉGRATION EUROPÉENNE: ÉTUDE COMPARÉE:
ALLEMAGNE, FRANCE, ITALIE (2015).
59. The French Conseil ruled in its decision on the Lisbon Treaty that
“[a]uthorisation to ratify the Treaty amending the Treaty on European Union
and the Treaty establishing the European Community requires a prior revision of the Constitution.” See Dècision 2007, supra note 57.
60. For general analysis of this “relatively cooperative strategy,” see
L’UNION EUROPÉENNE ET L’IDENTITÉ
FRANCOIS XAVIER MILLET,
CONSTITUTIONNELLE DES ETATS MEMBRES 25–46 (2013). Additionally, on the
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judges, the Conseil Constitutionnel defers a much wider margin
of discretion to political actors to set the constitutional limits in
the future development of European integration. The Conseil’s
role has been limited to ascertaining whether a prior revision of
the Constitution was necessary in cases of the ratification of
new Treaties that provided clauses running counter to the
Constitution. As far as constitutional identity was concerned, a
landmark decision of the Conseil was pronounced in 2006. In a
nutshell,61 the Conseil held that the obligation to implement
EU-secondary law only encountered limits in a principle “inherent in the constitutional identity of France, except when the
constituting power consents thereto.”62 What is to be included
in the “constitutional identity of France” is not clear at all, but
this notion “relates to what is not shared with other States, to
what is specific of France.”63
D. National Constitutional Identity in the Case Law of the
CJEU
Since 1992, national identity has been included in Treaties
under the formulation of Article F(1) of the Maastricht Treaty,
but it became subject to the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice
only after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty.64 NevertheFrench experience, see generally MARTIN QUESNEL, LA PROTECTION DE
L’IDENTITÉ CONSTITUTIONNELLE DE LA FRANCE (2015).
61. For a broad analysis, see Marie-Luce Paris, Europeanization and Constitutionalization: The Challenging Impact of a Double Transformative Process on French Law, 29 Y.B. EUR. L. 21 (2010).
62. Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision No. 2006540, July 17, 2006, ¶ 19 (Fr.), translation at http://www.conseilconstitutionnel.fr/conseilconstitutionnel/root/bank/download/2006540DCen2006_540dc.pdf.
63. CLAES, supra note 11, at 127 (referring to the official comment of the
Commissaire du government Gyonmar of the Conseil d’État published in 17
LES CAHIERS DU CONSEIL CONSTITUTIONNEL 28–29). A commentator has proposed the “principe de laïcite” and the social character of France as part of
this peculiarly French constitutional identity. See Commentaire de la
décision n° 2008-564 DC – 19 juin 2008, 25 CAH. CONS. CONST. (2008),
http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseilconstitutionnel/root/bank/download/2008564DCccc_564dc.pdf; Selma Josso,
Le caractère social de la République, principe inhérent à l’identité constitutionnelle
de
la
France?
(2008),
http://www.droitconstitutionnel.org/congresParis/comC1/JossoTXT.pdf.
64. Article 46 TEU pre-Lisbon outlined the boundaries of the CJEU’s jurisdiction with a positive list of reviewable provisions that did not include the
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less, the (then) European Court of Justice (ECJ) also made reference to the notion of national identity before the entry into
force of the latter Treaty. In fact, many cases that are often referred to as ECJ milestones in the matter of national identity—
such as Omega,65 Portugal v Commission (re Azores),66 or Gibraltar67—do not mention the Identity Clause in any of its
wordings.68 In some of these cases, the principle at stake was
the recognition and respect of diversity among the constitutional systems of Member States, without any reference to national or constitutional identity.69
However, an explicit reference to national identity and culture emerges in the ECJ’s case law already before the adoption
of Article F(1) in the Treaty of Maastricht. The first explicit
reference emerges in the Groener judgment in 1989.70 This case
dealt with the denial of the appointment of a Dutch citizen as a
teacher in Ireland due to her failure of an Irish language test.
In its decision, the ECJ found that the provisions of the Treaty
establishing the European Economic Community (ECC) do not
contradict the adoption of a policy seeking the protection and
provision on national identity. See Dobbs, supra note 22 at 3; Leonard F. M.
Besselink, Respecting Constitutional Identity in the European Union: An Essay on ECJ (Second Chamber), Case C 208/09, 22 December 2010, Ilonka
Sayn-Wittgenstein v. Landeshauptmann von Wien, 49 COMMON MKT. L. REV.
671, 678 (2012); Monica Claes, Negotiating Constitutional Identity or Whose
Identity is it Anyway?, in 107 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVERSATIONS IN EUROPE 217
(Monica Claes et al. eds., 1st ed. 2012). On the other hand, another author
has noted that this “scholarly fixation on the fact that identity clause was not
formally included in the Court’s jurisdiction as an explanation for why the
ECJ did not explicitly seek guidance from the clause when interpreting or
reviewing community legislation seems exaggerated.” CLOOTS, supra note 6,
at 165.
65. Case C-36/02, Omega Spielhallen und Automatenaufstellungs-GmbH
v. Oberbürgermeisterin der Bundesstadt Bonn, 2004 E.C.R. I-9641.
66. Case C-88/03, Portugal v. Commission, 2006 E.C.R. I-7145.
67. Case C-145/04, Spain v. United Kingdom, 2006 E.C.R. I-7961.
68. Surprisingly, none of the cases mentioned above even reference article
F(1) of the Treaty of Maastricht, article 6 of the Treaty of Amsterdam, supra
note 13, or article 4(2) of the Treaty of Lisbon.
69. Despite this fact, the cases mentioned above are often held as extremely significant with regard to constitutional identity. For example, CLOOTS,
supra note 6, at 7, considers these cases “among the most illustrious examples of the Court’s ‘silent’ sensitivity to domestic constitutional provisions
inspired by national identity.”
70. Case C-379/87, Anita Groener and the Minister for Education and the
City of Dublin Vocational Education Committee, 1989 E.C.R. 3967.
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promotion of the language of a Member State (both the national and official language) “as a means of expressing national and
cultural identity.”71
The Groener case can be held as a sort of ancestor to the
much more recent Runevič judgment. This case concerned a
dispute regarding the spelling of foreign names in Lithuania. A
Lithuanian citizen of Polish origin wanted her name to be registered under the Polish spelling rules (“Małgorzata Runiewicz
Wardyn”), but the Vilnius Civil registry refused her request on
the grounds that only surnames and forenames in a form that
complies with the spelling rules of the official national language may be registered. The ECJ argued that the spelling restriction did not constitute a restriction of the right of free
movement, and partly based its reasoning on the fact that the
provisions of EU law do not preclude the adoption of a policy
for the protection and promotion of a language of a Member
State, which is both the national language and the first official
language.72 The ECJ referred to Groener, inevitably enriching
its reference with normative coordinates that occurred after
Groener.73 In this respect, the Court stated in Runevič that
[a]ccording to the fourth subparagraph of Article 3(3) TEU
and Article 22 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
European Union, the Union must respect its rich cultural and
linguistic diversity. Article 4(2) EU provides that the Union
must also respect the national identity of its Member States,

71. Id. paras. 18, 19.
72. The Irish Constitution recognizes “the Irish language as the national
language.” Constitution of Ireland 1937 art. 8. In Groener, the court noted
that “the policy followed by Irish governments for many years has been designed not only to maintain but also to promote the use of Irish as a means of
expressing national identity and culture.” Case C-379/87, Anita Groener and
the Minister for Education and the City of Dublin Vocational Education
Committee, 1989 E.C.R. 3967, ¶ 18. The court additionally noted that the
then European Economic Communities Treaty “does not prohibit the adoption of a policy for the protection and promotion of a language of a Member
State which is both the national language and the first official language.” Id.
para. 19.
73. In Runevič, the Court could refer to both the CFREU, supra note 17,
and article 4(2) TEU, supra note 7. None of these documents existed at the
times of Groener.
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which includes protection of a State’s official national language.74

The spelling of names was also the subject matter of a previous case, the first carried out after the entry into force of Article 4(2) TEU. The case concerned Austrian constitutional law
prohibiting the use of surnames indicating a title of nobility.
This impeded an Austrian citizen who had resided in Germany
for fifteen years and who had acquired the surname of her
adoptive father, a German citizen, to use her full name
“Fürstin von Sayn-Wittgenstein.” Austrian authorities required
its amendment to “Sayn-Wittgenstein.”75
The applicant affirmed that a modification of her name damaged her professional capabilities, since she was known in luxury real estate under the previous full name. Therefore the applicant alleged that her freedom of movement and residence
was restricted by the application of Austrian constitutional law
to her name. The Austrian Government contended that the
constitutional law in question reflected the principle of equality
and intended to protect the constitutional identity of the Republic of Austria.76 The court’s reaction on this point was welcoming, noting that
74. Case C-391/09, Malgožata Runevič-Vardyn v. Vilniaus miesto savivaldybės administracija, 2011 E.C.R. I-3818, ¶ 86.
75. The Austrian Laws on the abolition of the nobility, the secular orders
of knighthood and of ladies, and certain titles and ranks, GESETZ ÜBER DIE
AUFHEBUNG DES ADELS, DER WELTLICHEN RITTER- UND DAMENORDEN UND
GEWISSER TITEL UND WÜRDEN, STAATSGESETZBLATT [LAW ON THE ABOLITION OF
THE NOBILITY, THE SECULAR ORDERS OF KNIGHTHOOD AND OF LADIES, AND
CERTAIN TITLES AND RANKS], Apr. 3, 1919 [STGBL] Nos. 211/1919, 1/1920
(Austria), have constitutional status under the Austrian Constitution,
BUNDES-VERFASSUNGSGESETZ [B-VG] [CONSTITUTION] BGBL No. 1/1930, as
last amended by Bundesverfassungsgesetz [BVG] BGBL I No. 2/2008, art.
149(1),
http://www.ris.bka.gv.at/GeltendeFassung.wxe?Abfrage=Bundesnormen&Ges
etzesnummer=10000138 (Austria). These laws and their implementing provisions abolished the right to use the nobiliary particle “von” and the right to
use designations of noble status, such as knight (“Ritter”), baron (“Freiherr”),
count (“Graf”), prince (“Fürst”), the honorary title of duke (“Herzog”), and
other relevant Austrian or foreign designations of status. For an overview of
the case and the applicable legislation, see Besselink, supra note 64.
76. In Ilonka Sayn-Wittgenstein, the court stated,
The Austrian Government contends, in particular, that the provisions at issue in the main proceedings are intended to protect the
constitutional identity of the Republic of Austria. The Law on the

512

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 41:2

[i]n that regard, it must be accepted that, in the context of
Austrian constitutional history, the Law on the abolition of
the nobility, as an element of national identity, may be taken
into consideration when a balance is struck between legitimate interests and the right of free movement of persons recognised under European Union law.77

The ECJ expressly acknowledges that national identities under
Article 4(2) TEU “include the status of the State as a Republic.”78
However, the principle of national identity was used by the
ECJ only as a supporting argument, since the reasoning of the
court was mainly based on the existence of a legitimate restriction. According to the case law of the court “[a]n obstacle to
the freedom of movement of persons can be justified only where
it is based on objective considerations and is proportionate to
the legitimate objective of the national provisions.”79 In this
specific case, the court held that the national provisions were
not disproportionate to the legitimate objective.80
E. National Constitutional Identity in AG’s Opinions
The brief overview of the CJEU’s decisions related to national
constitutional identity would give a partial picture of the judicial understanding of the notion, if the opinions of the AG were
not taken into account. AGs have showed, indeed, a strong in-

abolition of the nobility, even if it is not an element of the republican
principle which underlies the Federal Constitutional Law, constitutes a fundamental decision in favour of the formal equality of
treatment of all citizens before the law; no Austrian citizen may be
singled out by additional elements of a name in the form of appellations pertaining to nobility, titles or ranks, the only function of
which is to distinguish their bearer from other persons and which
have no connection with his profession or education.
Case C-208/09, Ilonka Sayn-Wittgenstein v. Landeshauptmann von Wien,
2010 E.C.R. I-13718, ¶ 74.
77. Id. ¶ 83.
78. Id. ¶ 92.
79. Id. ¶ 81.
80. In the court’s words, “the Austrian authorities responsible for civil
status matters do not appear to have gone further than is necessary in order
to ensure the attainment of the fundamental constitutional objective pursued
by them.” Id. ¶ 93.
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clination toward the notion of national identity.81 In the case
Spain v Eurojust, a reference to the former Article 6(3) TEU
and Article 22 of the CFREU is made with regard to linguistic
diversity, being the latter “a specific expression constituting
the plurality inherent in the European Union.”82 In Marrosu
and Sardino, constitutional requirements were invoked by the
Italian Government as the legal basis for a Member State (Italy, in that case), to prevent some unjustified fixed-term employment relationships from being converted into permanent
contracts of indefinite duration. In his Opinion, the AG recognized that
national authorities, in particular the constitutional courts,
should be given the responsibility to define the nature of the
specific national features that could justify such a difference
in treatment. Those authorities are best placed to define the
constitutional identity of the Member States which the European Union has undertaken to respect.83

An explicit reference to the constitutional understanding of
national identity may be found in the Opinion of AG Kokott in
the UGT Rioja case. First, it is recalled that under Article 6(3)
EU, the EU must respect the national identities of its Member
States. Second, AG Kokott interprets this clause to mean “that
the Union cannot encroach on the constitutional order of a
Member State, whether it is centralist or federal, and does not
in principle have any influence on the division of competences
within a Member State.”84 Finally, a reference to the revision of
that provision by the Treaty of Lisbon, with an explicit inten81. According to a well-informed author, “[t]he ‘objective defenders of law’
are indeed ‘identity lovers.’” See Laurence Burgorgue-Larsen, A Huron at the
Kirchberg Plateau or a Few Naive Thoughts on Constitutional Identity in the
Case-law of the Judge of the European Union, in NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL
IDENTITY AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 284 (Alejandro Saiz Arnaiz & Carina
Alcoberro Llivinia eds., 2013). In his study, Burgorgue-Larsen gives evidence
of the higher number of references to constitutional and national identity in
the AGs’ opinions than the number of references in ECJ’s judgments. Id.
82. Opinion of Advocate General Maduro, Case C-160/03, Spain v. Eurojust, 2005 E.C.R. I-2101, ¶ 35.
83. Opinion of Advocate General Maduro, Case C-53/04, Cristiano Marrosu
v. Azienda Ospedaliera Ospedale San Martino di Genova e Cliniche
Universitarie Convenzionate, 2005 E.C.R. I-7231, ¶ 40.
84. Joined Cases C‑428/06 to C‑434/06, Unión General de Trabajadores de
La Rioja v. Juntas Generales del Territorio Histórico de Vizcaya, 2008 E.C.R.
I-6747, para. 54.
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tion of the Union to respect the constitutional structures of
Member States, supports the constitutional understanding of
the Identity Clause. The same AG referred to the former Article 6(3) in the UTECA case, with regard to “respect for and
promotion of the diversity of its cultures.”85
In 2008, AG Maduro delivered his much quoted opinion in
the Michaniki case,86 by far the most important judicial manifesto on the history and function of the Identity Clause. The
case dealt with the Article 14, paragraph 9 of the Greek Constitution. This provision excluded tenderers involved in the media
sector from participating in public procurement contracts, and
provided a sort of presumption of incompatibility between media sector agents and public tenderers, with the purpose of ensuring equal treatment and transparency.87 AG Maduro recognized that the “constitutional identity of the Member States
can thus constitute a legitimate interest which, in principle,
justifies a restriction of the obligations imposed by Community
law.”88 In fact, according to the AG’s view, the Greek legislation
exceeded what was necessary so as to observe equal treatment
and therefore did not satisfy the requirement of the principle of
proportionality.
In June 2009, AG Colomber released the Umweltanwalt von
Kärnten case,89 which stated that the obligation to respect national identities plays a role in the identification of national
authorities that are entitled to submit a reference for a preliminary ruling. According to Colomber’s opinion,
[i]f a Member State allocates judicial duties to quasi-judicial
bodies and confirms that allocation when such a body is established, that is an expression of will closely linked to national
identity and national constitutional autonomy. An expression
the Court must respect. Accordingly, Article 234 EC provides
85. Opinion of Advocate General Kokott, Case C-222/07, Unión de Televisiones Comerciales Asociadas, 2008 E.C.R. I-06747, ¶ 93.
86. Case C-213/07, Michaniki AE v. Ethniko Simvoulio Radiotileorasis,
2008 E.C.R. I-09999.
87. For further illustration of this case, see the case comment by Vasiliki
Kosta, European Court of Justice Case C-213/07, Michaniki AE v. Ethniko
Simvoulio Radiotileorasis, Ipourgos Epikratias, 5 EUR. CONST. L. REV. 501
(2009).
88. Opinion of Advocate General Maduro, Case C-213/07, Michaniki AE v.
Ethniko Simvoulio Radiotileorasis, 2008 E.C.R. I-09999, ¶ 33.
89. Opinion of Advocate General Colomber, Case C-205/08, Umweltanwalt
von Kärnten v. Kärntner Landesregierung, 2009 E.C.R. I-11525.
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for a communication channel with national authorities
which constitutionally have the power to dispense justice. In
some Member States that role is entrusted exclusively to the
judiciary while in others it is divided between a number of
bodies, in a lawful configuration of institutional organisation
which Community law does not question.90

In 2012, AG Bot delivered an important opinion in the Melloni case,91 which was submitted to the Court with the first preliminary reference by the Spanish Constitutional Court.92 The
case concerned a European arrest warrant issued by Italy
against Melloni, an Italian citizen, who was sentenced in absentia before an Italian judge.93 Melloni challenged the case
before the Constitutional Court of Spain, arguing that the sentence issued in Italy encroached upon his right to a fair trial.
AG Bot affirmed that in principle “[a] Member State which
considers that a provision of secondary law adversely affects its
national identity may therefore challenge it on the basis of Article 4(2) TEU,”94 but the facts in the Melloni case did not meet
this criterion. According to the AG’s view, “the participation of
the defendant at his trial is not covered by the concept of the
national identity of the Kingdom of Spain.”95 AG Bot finally
discerned between the protection of a fundamental right and
the application of Article 4(2) TEU, namely the respect of national identity or, more specifically, the constitutional identity
of a Member State.
Finally in January 2015, AG Cruz Villalón released his opinion on the Gauweiler case. The case derived its importance
from the fact that it concerned the financial operations of the
European Central Bank (ECB) and that the case had been
promoted with the first reference for a preliminary ruling from
90. Id. ¶ 47.
91. Opinion of Advocate General Bot, Case C-399/11, Criminal Proceedings
Against Stefano Melloni, ECLI:EU:C:2012:600 (E.C.J.).
92. A.T.S.,
June
9,
2011
(A.T.C.,
No.
86),
http://www.tribunalconstitucional.es/en/jurisprudencia/Pages/Auto.aspx?cod=
23243 (Spain).
93. For further illustration of the case, see Leonard F. M. Besselink, The
Parameters of Constitutional Conflict After Melloni, 39 EUR. L. REV. 531
(2014); Nik de Boer, Addressing rights divergences under the Charter: Melloni, 50 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1083 (2013).
94. Opinion of Advocate General Case Bot, C-399/11, Criminal Proceedings
Against Stefano Melloni, ECLI:EU:C:2012:600, para. 139 (E.C.J.).
95. Id. para. 140.
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the BVerfG. In its decision, the German Tribunal had flatly rejected any bridging function between the German Basic Law
and EU law of Article 4(2) TEU, noting that “the identity review performed by the Federal Constitutional Court is fundamentally different from the review under Art 4 (2) sentence 1
TEU by the Court of Justice of the European Union.”96 AG
Cruz Villalón devoted a significant paragraph of his opinion to
this point. He noted that it seems,
an all but impossible task to preserve this Union, as we know
it today, if it is to be made subject to an absolute reservation,
ill-defined and virtually at the discretion of each of the Member States, which takes the form of a category described as
“constitutional identity.” That is particularly the case if that
“constitutional identity” is stated to be different from the “national identity” referred to in Article 4(2) TEU.97

According to the AG’s opinion, this would lead EU law toward
an unacceptable subordinate position and would moreover neglect the hard work done to reconcile EU law with the constitutional traditions common to the Member States. However, Cruz
Villalón posited an alternative approach that would consist in
“a clearly understood, open, attitude to EU law” and “should in
the medium and long term give rise, as a principle, to basic
convergence between the constitutional identity of the Union
and that of each of the Member States.”98
F. Article 4(2) TEU: an “Incomplete Contract”
Despite the vast attention devoted to Article 4(2) TEU by legal scholarship, the notion of constitutional identity remains
unclear. “Ambiguity” is one of the adjectives that is more frequently associated with the concept of national and constitutional identity.99 This seems to stem from the fact that identity
is considered “an essentially contested concept as there is no
96. BVerfG,
2
BvR
2728/13,
Jan.
14,
2014,
para
29,
https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/entscheidungen/rs20140114_2bvr2
72813en.html.
97. Opinion of Advocate General Cruz, Case C-62/14, Gauweiler v.
Deutscher Bundestag, ECLI:EC:C:2015:7, ¶ 59 (E.C.J.).
98. Id. para. 61.
99. See, e.g., CONSTANCE GREWE & JOËL RIDEAU, L’IDENTITÉ
CONSTITUTIONNELLE DES ÉTATS MEMBRES DE L’UNION EUROPÉENNE: FLASH BACK
SUR LE COMING-OUT D’UN CONCEPT AMBIGU (2010); Dobbs, supra note 22, at 9;
CLOOTS, supra note 6, at 137.
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agreement over what it means or refers to.”100 The controversial nature of identity challenges constitutional theorists,
whose interests have been focused on reducing the ambiguity of
the concept.101 One could argue, however, that a certain degree
of indeterminacy of the notion may have a positive effect on the
constitutional system. The EU represents an innovative model,
and innovation always brings about risks and unpredictable
developments. Against this background, loose concepts may
play the role of a safety valve and avoid ultimate constitutional
crashes. Such an experience is not uncommon in the constitutional developments of pluralistic polities. Ambiguity may be
the optimal trade-off to neutralized precise disagreements,
which are invisible in the formulation of general constitutional
principles that are prone to different readings and understandings. This praxis is familiar in the postwar constitutional experience. Disagreements are settled through “incompletely theorized agreement,” to use the language of Cass Sunstein,102 or
“irregular contracts,” using the language of transaction-cost
economics. The use of these theoretical “tricks,” blunts, or at
least delays in potential conflicts, insofar as the formulation of
the agreed upon principles is broad enough to welcome different interpretations preferred by the negotiators.
Empirical evidence of an identity disagreement may be found
in the analysis of the working documents of the European Convention, dealing with the provision set out in Article I-5 of the
ill-fated CT. Indeed, the current formulation of Article 4(2)
TEU is built on the same wording of the so-called Christophersen clause of the CT. Therefore the travaux préparatoires
of the European Convention remains a meaningful source to
discuss the above mentioned misunderstanding.103
As a matter of fact, a cleavage emerged between the Member
States’ representatives and the European Commission’s repre100. Michel Rosenfeld, Constitutional Identity, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK
756 (2013).
101. See generally, e.g., ROSENFELD, supra note 10; GARY JEFFREY
JACOBSOHN, CONSTITUTIONAL IDENTITY (2010).
102. Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 HARV. L.
REV. 1733 (1995).
103. See Guastaferro, supra note 25, at 271. It is noted that “expediency and
self-interest seem to be what motivated the drafters” and that “politics rather
than principle lay at the root of the identity clause’s incorporation into the
Treaties.” CLOOTS, supra note 6, at 82–83.
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sentatives in the proceedings of the Working Group V, chaired
by Mr. Hennig Christophersen.104 The Working Group mandate
dealt with a clearer delimitation of competence between the EU
and the Member States, but formally covered the narrower issue of a better definition and regulation of complementary
competences in the CT.105 Among the members of the working
group, both Members States’ and the Commission’s representatives shared one common concern, namely the necessity to contain EU competence creep. The means used to address this
shared concern were nonetheless subject to a deep disagreement. The Member States’ main worry was the “delimitation of
the EU scope of action vis-à-vis those of the Member States.”106
Some of the proposals of the Member States’ representatives
drew on the Lamossoure Report107 of the European Parliament,
where the problem of the distribution of competences between
the EU and Member States had been addressed through a tripartite classification: a) competences of the EU, b) exclusive
competence of the Member States, and c) EU’s and Member
States’ shared competences (concurrent and complementary).
In the Member States’ representative views, the delimitation
of the EU competence was the main concern of Working Group
V.108 Conversely, the Commission representatives focused
104. The Working Group V of the European Convention worked on “complementary competencies.” Revised Draft Report from the Secretariat to Working Group V, Working Doc. No. 30 REV 1, at 1 (Oct. 25, 2002),
http://european-convention.europa.eu/docs/wd5/4044.pdf. The tight connection between this issue and national identities of the Member States is already stressed in the introductory section of the Working Group’s Report. Id.
at 2 (“Complementary competence in the TEC is a part of the general system
of Union competence and covers national policy areas of significance for the
identity of the Member States.”).
105. See Guideline Paper for Discussion of Areas of Assisting Measures from
the Secretariat to Working Group V, Working Doc. No. 29 (Oct. 2, 2002),
http://european-convention.europa.eu/docs/wd5/3354.pdf.
106. Guastaferro, supra note 25, at 18.
107. Alain Lamassoure (Rapporteur), Comm. on Constitutional Affairs, Report on the Division of Competences Between the EU and the Member States
(Apr. 24, 2002), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=//EP//NONSGML+REPORT+A5-2002-0133+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN.
108. See Notes of Member States’ Representatives Among the Documents of
Working
Group
V
of
the
European
Convention,
(July
10,
2011)
EUROPEANCONVENTION.EUROPA.EU
EN&Content=WGV&splang=. See, in particular, Working Group V, Note from
Michael Frendo on Classification of Competences and Interpretation by the
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much more on other aspects, namely the specification of the
scale of intervention and the exercise of EU action.109 A catalogue of Member States’ exclusive competences, possibly bearing the core of Member States’ constitutional identity in the
Lissabon-Urteil manner, was therefore incompatible with the
Commission’s view. According to the latter, a classification of
competences was far too rigid and simplistic.110
The Member States interpreted the Cristophersen clause as a
sort of competence clause protecting Member States’ powers
under the guise of respect for national identities, exactly as the
Commission was determined not to. The terms of the disagreement were rather clear on the position of the Commission,
where it clarified that an Identity Clause ought “not lead to the
limitation of the scope and exercise of the competencies allocated to the Union to take account of the specific requirements of
each Member State, for this would jeopardize the distribution
of competencies established by the Treaty.”111
On the other side of the fence, Member States were reluctant
to advocate for the introduction of national exclusive competences because this could have implied that the sovereign auECJ (Working Group 5 of the European Union Convention, Working Doc. 8,
July 15, 2002), http://european-convention.europa.eu/docs/wd5/1898.pdf; Peter
Altmaier, Note on “the Division of Competencies Between the Union and the
Member States (Working Group 5 of the European Union Convention, Working
Doc.
9,
July
15,
2002),
http://europeanconvention.europa.eu/docs/wd5/1909.pdf.
109. See Note from the European Commission on “Delimitation of Powers: A
Matter Scale of Intervention” (Working Group 5 of the European Union Convention,
Working
Doc.
4,
July
10,
2002),
http://europeanconvention.europa.eu/docs/wd5/1722.pdf; Note on “The European Union’s
Complementary Powers: Scope and Limits”(Working Group 5 of the Eur. Convention, Working Doc. No. 7, July 29, 2002), http://europeanconvention.europa.eu/docs/wd5/1887.pdf, David Heathcoat-Amory, Note on
the Convention (Working Group 5 of the Eur. Convention, Working Doc. No.
14, July 10, 2002), http://european-convention.europa.eu/docs/wd5/1975.pdf.
110. It was noted that “in the Commission’s view – much more defensive of
the status quo – there was no space for any explicit or more nuanced enumeration of Member States’ reserved powers – what the ‘Christophersen clause’
actually represented for the Member States’ Representative.” For a broad
analysis of the travaux préparatoires regarding the Identity Clause, see
Guastaferro, supra note 25, at 24.
111. Paolo Ponzano, Commission’s Representative, Combining Clarity and
Flexibility in the European Union’s System of Competencies (Working Group
V European Convention, Working Paper No. 5, Sept. 30, 2002),
http://european-convention.europa.eu/docs/wd5/3134.pdf.
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thority allocating competences was the Union. This approach
would have been inconsistent with the zealously preserved idea
of the Member States as masters of the Treaties and the principal of conferral.
In summation, the Commission refused the idea of the Identity Clause as a “counter-limits’ clause” in the sense of the
BVerfG’s Lissabon-doctrine; the Member States’ representative
interpreted the clause as a sort of list of Member States’ reserved powers, even if they were reluctant to the idea of introducing such an enumeration of powers in the CT.112
The final wording of the Christophersen clause (now Article
4(2) TEU, with the addition of a final sentence) did not draw
any list of Member States’ exclusive competences, and avoided
to specify that its application was limited to the cases of EU
competences exercise.113 Finally, the drafting of the “Identity
Clause” met the Commission’s and Member States’ representative expectations, although for very different reasons.
In this context, it is hardly surprising that the interpretation
of Article 4(2) TEU is controversial. This controversy is not
necessarily linked to bad drafting of the Treaty. Ambiguity may
not be an unintended character of the national constitutional
Identity Clause.114 Article 4(2) TEU possesses some elements
that may answer the question of sovereignty in the EU and in
the Member States, but not enough to determine an ultimate
answer. When the Treaty drafters tried to give such an answer,
they failed. Even in the ill-fated CT, a proper supremacy clause
was missing—if compared with Article 6 of the U.S. Constitu112. Guastaferro has noted that “the idea of enumerating Member States’
exclusive powers” was finally shared by the Member States’ and the EU
commission’s representatives “although resting on different reasons.”
Guastaferro, supra note 25, at 27.
113. In an earlier stage of drafting, the Christophersen clause had an incipit that stated “when exercising its competencies, the Union shall respect the
national identities.” See Note by Peter Altmaier on “The Division of Competencies Between the Union and the Member States” (revised version) to Working
Group V, Working Doc. No. 20 (Sept. 4, 2002), http://europeanconvention.europa.eu/docs/wd5/2341.pdf.; Guastaferro, supra note 25, at 283.
However, in subsequent drafting, the incipit was removed.
114. One could say the uncertainty of the concept of national identity constitutes its most striking aspect. JUDT, surpa note 2, at 637 (quoting Milan
Kundera, who said of the existence of the Czech nation, “The existence of
Czech nation was never a certainty, and precisely this uncertainty constitutes its most striking aspect.”).
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tion—and after Lisbon the only point the parties managed to
agree upon was an almost illegible declaration, adopting an
opinion of the Council’s legal service.115
G. In Search of a New Canon: Constitutional Identity out of the
Courts
The overview of the CJEU’s case law related to Article 4(2)—
and to Article 6(3)/F(1) TEU before Lisbon—shows an enormous discrepancy between the understanding of national identity “in the books” and national constitutional identity in action. Despite the “excess of literature on constitutional identity,”116 the CJEU rarely referred to the Identity Clause.
Nonetheless there are good reasons to welcome the CJEU’s
reluctance to use the identity argument, being “left between a
rock and a hard place in relation to the scope of the provision.”117 Under a narrow interpretation of the Identity Clause,
the CJEU exposes EU law to the risk of rejection of the principle of primacy from the Member States’ constitutional and Supreme Courts. However a broader interpretation of the clause
that welcomes the national constitutional courts’ counterlimits
doctrines, would consist of a strong concession to Member
States’ sovereignty claims, equally undermining the CJEU’s
understanding of the principle of primacy.
This is why the Identity Clause works much better if it remains a dead letter of the Treaties and goes unused, at least in
courts. As a judicial “nuclear weapon,” a concrete application of
115. The Declaration adopted the Council’s legal service opinion, which
substantially referred to the CJEU’s settled case law:
It results from the case-law of the Court of Justice that primacy of
EC law is a cornerstone principle of Community law. According to
the Court, this principle is inherent to the specific nature of the European Community. At the time of the first judgment of this established case law (Costa/ENEL, 15 July 1964, Case 6/644) there was no
mention of primacy in the treaty. It is still the case today. The fact
that the principle of primacy will not be included in the future treaty
shall not in any way change the existence of the principle and the existing case-law of the Court of Justice.
Opinion of the Legal Service on the Primacy of EC Law, E.C. Doc. No.
11197/07 (June 22, 2007), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_DOC-073_en.doc.
116. Burgorgue-Larsen, supra note 81, at 275.
117. Dobbs, supra note 22, at 333–34.
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the national constitutional identity argument would probably
trigger violent reactions from CJEU and/or Member States.
The CJEU would react if the notion is used by the Member
States’ constitutional courts to protect the national legal order
from European constitutional spillovers. While the Member
States would react, if the notion of Member States’ national
identity is used or misused by the CJEU.
Despite the risks of a judicial nuclear “cold-war” between the
CJEU and the Member States’ constitutional and Supreme
Courts, for a long time the most reputable legal literature
placed great confidence in the miraculous effect of judicial dialogue.118 The Europeanization of counterlimits under Article
4(2) TEU was supposed to defuse any risk of nuclear war between courts.
Recent developments of the judicial interactions around the
notion of identity present quite a different reality. The BVerfG
(a sort of commander-in-chief of the national constitutional
courts’ army in this respect) first adopted a swinging approach
between sovereignist temptations (Lissabon-Urteil) and Europarechtsfreundlichkeit (openness towards European law)
(Mangold-Urteil).119 Then, after a long lasting reluctance to en118. On the global (and particularly European) judicial dialogue see, generally and among many others, Francis G. Jacobs, Judicial Dialogue and the
Cross-Fertilization of Legal Systems: The European Court of Justice, 38 TEX.
INT’L L. J. 547 (2003); Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Global Community of Courts,
44 HARV. INT’L L.J. 191 (2003); Anne-Marie Slaughter, Judicial Globalization,
40 VA. J. INT’L L. 1103 (1999); Melissa A. Waters, Mediating Norms and Identity: The Role of Transnational Judicial Dialogue in Creating and Enforcing
International Law, 93 GA. L.J. 487 (2004); Andreas Voβkuhle, Multilevel Cooperation of the European Constitutional Courts: Der Europäische Verfassungsgerichtsverbund, 6 EUR. CONST. L. REV. 175 (2010); ANNE-MARIE
SLAUGHTER, ALEC STONE SWEET & J. H. H. WEILER, THE EUROPEAN COURTS
AND NATIONAL COURTS: DOCTRINE AND JURISPRUDENCE (1998); GIUSEPPE
MARTINICO & ORESTE POLLICINO, THE INTERACTION BETWEEN EUROPE’S LEGAL
SYSTEMS: JUDICIAL DIALOGUE AND THE CREATION OF SUPRANATIONAL LAWS
(2012).
119. On these developments, see Theodore Konstadinides, Constitutional
Identity as a Shield and as a Sword: The European Legal Order Within the
Framework of National Constitutional Settlement, 13 CAMBRIDGE Y.B. EUR.
LEGAL STUD. 195 (2012). Mr. Konstadinides’s considerations on the use of
constitutional identity “as a sword” are largely borne out by the successive
case law of the BVerfG, particularly with regard to the OMT case, BVerfG, 2
BvR
2728/13,
Jan.
14,
2014,
http://www.bverfg.de/e/rs20140114_2bvr272813en.html.
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gage directly with the CJEU, the BVerfG finally submitted its
first preliminary reference question to the CJEU in the Outright Monetary Transactions (“OMT”) case in 2012.120 The OMT
case concerned the decision of the ECB to establish a framework for the purchase of the secondary market of a potentially
unlimited amount of government bonds from (only) certain
Member States.121 When the BVerfG submitted its reference,
the program had only been announced, and still has not been
put into effect. Nonetheless, the sole announcement of the Program triggered two remarkable reactions: it calmed down the
financial markets and drew the anger of the BVerfG.
The Federal Constitutional Tribunal in Karlsruhe heard four
separate Verfassungsbeschwerde (individual constitutional
complaints)122 and a complaint through Organstreitverfahren.
The complaints contested, above all, that the nonmonetary but
economic nature of the Program, was forbidden by Articles
119,123 123,124 127, and 282125 Treaty on the Functioning of the

120. BVerfG,
2
BvR
2728/13,
Jan.
14,
2014,
http://www.bverfg.de/e/rs20140114_2bvr272813en.html. Regarding the OMT
reference, see Daniela Caruso, Lost at Sea, 15 GER. L.J. 1197, 1201–02 (2014);
Mattias Wendel, Exceeding Judicial Competence in the Name of Democracy:
The German Federal Constitutional Court’s OMT Reference, 10 EUR. CONST.
L. REV. 263 (2014).
121. Press Release, European Cent. Bank, Tech Features of Outright Monetary
Transactions
(Sept.
6,
2012),
http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2012/html/pr120906_1.en.html.
122. The constitutional complaints were on an individual basis, provided
that the action was joined by 37,000 German citizens. See BVerfG, 2, BvR
1390/12,
Mar.
18,
2014,
https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/DE/2
014/03/rs20140318_2bvr139012.html. For a related comment, see Wendel,
supra note 120, at 267.
123. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union art. 119, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 47 [hereinafter TFEU]. Article 119(1) and
(2) TFEU addresses the much debated issue of the activities that the Union
and the Member States may adopt through economic or monetary policies:
1. For the purposes set out in Article 3 of the Treaty on European
Union, the activities of the Member States and the Union shall include, as provided in the Treaties, the adoption of an economic policy
which is based on the close coordination of Member States’ economic
policies, on the internal market and on the definition of common objectives, and conducted in accordance with the principle of an open
market economy with free competition.
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European Union (TFEU). In its decision to submit the reference to the CJEU, the BVerfG expressly assumed that the decision of the ECB was ultra vires and infringed the constitutional
identity of Germany. Nonetheless, instead of directly declaring
the decision ultra vires and/or violating German constitutional
identity, the German Federal Tribunal submitted a reference
for a preliminary ruling to the CJEU. Ultimately, the ECJ opted for a largely diplomatic decision. The court considered the
program compatible with EU law but filled its motivation with
reassurances and reasons for the BVerfG to welcome the judgment as a victory of the German Federal Constitutional Court’s
approach.
Regarding to the protection of the German constitutional
identity, the BVerfG’s approach was far from cooperative. On
the contrary, in its reference, the German Tribunal noted that
“the identity review performed by the Federal Constitutional
Court is fundamentally different from the review under Article
4(2) sentence 1 TEU by the Court of Justice of the European

2. Concurrently with the foregoing, and as provided in the Treaties
and in accordance with the procedures set out therein, these activities shall include a single currency, the euro, and the definition and
conduct of a single monetary policy and exchange-rate policy the
primary objective of both of which shall be to maintain price stability
and, without prejudice to this objective, to support the general economic policies in the Union, in accordance with the principle of an
open market economy with free competition.
Id. art. 119(1), (2).
124. Article 123 aims to encourage the Member States to follow a sound
budgetary policy, not allowing monetary financing of public deficits or privileged access by public authorities to the financial markets:
Overdraft facilities or any other type of credit facility with the European Central Bank or with the central banks of the Member States
(hereinafter referred to as ‘national central banks’) in favour of Union institutions, bodies, offices or agencies, central governments, regional, local or other public authorities, other bodies governed by
public law, or public undertakings of Member States shall be prohibited, as shall the purchase directly from them by the European Central Bank or national central banks of debt instruments.
TFEU art. 123
125. TFEU arts. 127, 282 (“[T]he primary objective of the European System
of Central Banks shall be to maintain price stability.”).
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Union.”126 The point did not go unnoticed by the AG, who objected that such interpretation of national constitutional identity as an absolute reservation would put EU law in a subordinate position.127 Unlike the AG, the ECJ preferred not to address this point in its decision. At the time of writing, the decision is pending again before the German BVerfG, which in
principle might still declare the program unconstitutional as
being a violation of the German constitutional identity. The
effort made by the ECJ to defuse this judicial crisis makes this
scenario quite implausible, but nonetheless the OMT case
shows that the so-called judicial dialogue “in action” may not
have the hoped for results when constitutional identity is at
stake. Whatever the follow-up of the ECJ’s decision, the OMT
case reveals all the dangers and shortcomings of the judicial
dialogue. A dialogue, when identity issues and vital interests of
a Member State are at stake, that seems likely to turn into a
deaf ultimatum.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL IDENTITY AND DIFFERENTIATED
INTEGRATION
The previously summarized judicial developments suggest
that blind faith in judicial dialogue may fall short of providing
viable solutions when identity-related issues are at stake.
Moreover, this is not the only reason to dismiss the myth of the
miraculous effect of judicial dialogue. Another reason stems
from the problem of framing constitutional identity. In fact, an
orthodox conception of this controversial concept usually focuses on broadly shared principles such as democracy, rule of law,
126. The acquis of the 1985 Schengen Treaty on the gradual abolition of
common border checks was integrated in the EU framework by Protocol B to
the Treaty of Amsterdam, supra note 13, signed in 1997 and entered into
force in 1999. BVerfG, 2 BvR 2728/13, Jan. 14, 2014, para. 29.
127. AG Cruz Villalòn observed that it seemed
an all but impossible task to preserve this Union, as we know it today, if it is to be made subject to an absolute reservation, ill-defined
and virtually at the discretion of each of the Member States, which
takes the form of a category described as “constitutional identity.”
That is particularly the case if that “constitutional identity” is stated
to be different from the “national identity” referred to in Article 4(2)
TEU.
Opinion of Advocate General Villalón, Case C-62/14, Gauweiler v. Deutscher
Bundestag, ECLI:EU:C:2015:400, para. 59.
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and fundamental rights. Chances for a constitutional clash are
scarce and lie more on interpretative rather than substantive
grounds. Indeed, it is rather unlikely that the development of
the European integration will move in the opposite direction of
the basic principles of constitutionalism. In many cases, the
real issue with constitutional identity-related questions is with
the outcomes of a balancing process. It is extremely implausible, to put it mildly, that an EU regulation shall suddenly declare elections illegal, entrust all jurisdictional competences to
Governments, or enact other similar infringements of basic
principles of constitutionalism.
Those principles are deeply rooted and widely shared by all
Member States, and with regard to those principles, the European orchestra of EU institutions and Member States can
count on a symphonic musical score. Dissonances that may
arise due to different readings of those basic constitutional
principles would be linked to musical execution rather than the
composition of the musical score.
A different case may arise when certain elements of a Member State’s constitutional identity are part of a particular legal
tradition of that Member State. In this respect, the emergence
of legal conflicts is much more plausible. Under these circumstances no symphony can be played, given the substantial “cacophony”128 of the musical score. Such a perspective would take
into account those elements of the constitutional identity that
distinguish a particular constitution from another,129 focusing
on a heterodox conception of the notion of national constitutional identity. This notion emphasizes non-shared elements of
the Member States’ constitutional identities, and as an added
value, opens the door to different interpretations, rather than
adding a supplementary analysis to the massive amount of
scholarly investigation on the judicial understanding of the
Identity Clause. Empirical evidence demonstrates that, in this
respect, differentiated integration has already played a role. As
a result, Part II of this article argues that the current state of
128. The image of a “danger of constitutional cacophony in relation to national identity” is drawn from von Bogdandy & Schill, supra note 18, at 1435.
129. For an analysis of this constitutional conception of the identity concept,
in opposition to the concept of the identity of the people, see José Luis Martí,
Two Different Ideas of Constitutional Identity: Identity of the Constitution v.
Identity of the People, in NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL IDENTITY AND EUROPEAN
INTEGRATION 17 (2013).
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European integration calls for a more central role for differentiated integration and that differentiated integration can serve
as an efficient instrument of preventive neutralization of ultimate conflicts between EU law and particular (non-shared) elements of national constitutional identity.
A. An Analytical Approach: Constitutional Differentiated Integration in the EU
The accommodation of increasingly variegated national preferences in the European project is far from novel. On the contrary, differentiated integration is a concept that was not alien
to the very first steps of European integration.130 The Treaty of
Rome of 1957 was not a flinty body of norms as it was equally
applicable in every corner of the EEC. It admitted the perpetuation of preexisting forms of regional cooperation among the
Benelux countries, acknowledging a sort of primitive form of
enhanced cooperation.131 Part Four of the Treaty was devoted
to the “Association of the Overseas Countries and Territories,”
recognizing a special status and a limited application of the
norms of the treaties to the territories having special relations
with Belgium, France, Italy, the Netherlands, and the United
Kingdom.132 Special provisions were provided to compensate for
the economic disadvantages caused by the division of Germany,133 and transitional ad hoc arrangements and derogations
130. See Dominik Hanf, Flexibility Clauses in the Founding Treaties, from
Rome to Nice, in THE MANY FACES OF DIFFERENTIATION IN EU LAW 3 (2001).
131. See Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community art. 233,
Mar. 25 1957, 298 U.N.T.S 3, at 91 [hereinafter EEC Treaty] (“The provisions
of this Treaty shall not preclude the existence or completion of regional unions between Belgium and Luxembourg, or between Belgium, Luxembourg
and the Netherlands, to the extent that the objectives of these regional unions are not attained by application of this Treaty.”). Similarly, a Nordic regional cooperation agreement between Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway,
and Sweden survived and was explicitly mentioned in the Accession Treaties
of the States that successively joined the Union. See Act Concerning the Conditions of Accession of the Kingdom of Norway, the Republic of Austria, the
Republic of Finland, and the Kingdom of Sweden, Joint Declaration on Nordic Cooperation, Aug. 29, 1994, 1994 O.J. (C 241) 9, 392.
132. Hanf, supra note 130, at 65–67, 118–99.
133. Article 82 of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community in 1957 stated that:
The provisions of this Title shall not form an obstacle to the application of measures taken in the Federal Republic of Germany to the
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were commonly introduced in the Accession Treaties of new
Member States.134
Since the signature of the first European Treaties, things
have changed significantly. From a small group of relatively
homogeneous Member States, the European integration project
has advanced considerably. The six founding Member States
formed a small and homogeneous club in postwar Europe: the
gap in GDP per capita between richer and poorer economies
was much smaller in 1951 than today.135 The political homogeneity is also incomparable, considering that all six foreign ministers who signed the Treaty of the European Steel and Coal
Community in 1951 were members of their respective Christian Democratic Parties.136
A growing internal heterogeneity in the EU is well captured
by a comparison with the United States. Regional inequality is
today much greater in the EU than in the United States.137 The
average per capita income is immensely more disproportionate
extent that such measures are required in order to compensate for
the economic disadvantages caused by the division of Germany to
the economy of certain areas of the Federal Republic affected by that
division.
EEC Treaty, supra note 131, art. 82. Article 92(2) stated:
The following shall be compatible with the common market: . . . c)
aid granted to the economy of certain areas of the Federal Republic
of Germany affected by the division of Germany, in so far as such aid
is required in order to compensate for the economic disadvantages
caused by that division
Id. art. 92(2).
134. More than half of the protocols on the Treaty of Rome provided derogations. The same was true for most of the Accession’s treaties. See Hanf, supra
note 130.
135. In 2007, when Romania accessed the EU, German GDP per capita was
four times the Romanian GDP. In 1951, the lowest GDP per capita amounted
to more than half of the biggest GDP accounted for, despite the very different
impact of war on national economies. As a matter of fact, this gap was even
smaller in 1957, when the Treaty of Rome was signed by the same six Member States. Data is obtained from Jutta Bolt & Jan Luiten Zanden, THE
MADDISON
PROJECT
(2013),
The
Maddison-Project,
http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/maddison-project/home.htm (last visited Jan.
15, 2016).
136. JUDT, supra note 2, at 157.
137. GIANDOMENICO MAJONE, RETHINKING THE UNION OF EUROPE POST
CRISIS: HAS INTEGRATION GONE TOO FAR? 39 (2014).
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between Luxembourg and Romania than between the States of
New York and Mississippi. The ratio amount at more than ten
times in the first case and less than two times in the latter.138
The enlargement of the EU certainly had an important impact
on this picture, but a growing diversity was already a settled
trend before 2004.139 In fact, theories of integration, disintegration, and differentiated integration trace back to the 1970s.140
138. The comparison of the GDP per capita in Luxembourg and Romania is
striking but may be dismissed as inaccurate, as long as it considers extreme
examples. Nonetheless, it is remarkable that Romania’s GDP per capita
amounts to less than half of the GDP per capita in no less than fifteen Member States. Similar outcomes would result if GDP per capita of Bulgaria,
Hungary, or Croatia were used for the comparison. Regional Data, BUREAU
ECON. ANALYSIS, http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_regional.cfm (last updated
June 10, 2015); Gross Domestic Product at Market Prices, STAT. OFF. EUR.
COMMUNITIES,
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table.do?tab=table&plugin=1&language=en
&pcode=tec00001 (last visited Oct. 21, 2015).
139. To put it in another way,
[t]he levels of economic development are very different from one
Member State to another. Taking into account the figures available
for the year 2009 and with 100 as the index average for the EU-27
GDP per capita, seven Member States were below 65% of this average and two of them were around 45% of this average. . . . As a comparison, for the USA and for the same year 2009, no State was less
than 70% of the average national index.
The analysis is based on EUROSTAT data, see Jean-Claude Piris, It is Time
for the Euro Area to Develop Further Closer Cooperation Among its Members
31 (Jean Monnet Ctr. for Int’l & RegionalEcon. Law & Justice, Working Paper
No.
05/11)
(2011),
http://jeanmonnetprogram.org/wpcontent/uploads/2014/12/110501.pdf. This growing heterogeneity does not
emerge only from a comparison with the United States, but also from a comparison between the economic picture of Europe at the very first steps of the
integration project with today’s picture. In 2007, when Romania accessed the
EU, German GDP per capita was four times the Romanian GDP. Bolt & Zanden, supra note 135. In 1951, the lowest GDP per capita amounted to more
than half of the biggest GDP per capita, despite the very different impact of
the war on national economies. Id. As a matter of fact, this gap was even
smaller in 1957, when the Treaty of Rome was signed by the same six Member States. Id.
140. This debate has been characterized by “an excess of terminology, which
can give even the most experienced specialist of European integration a severe case of semantic indigestion.” See Alexander C.G. Stubb, A Categorization of Differentiated Integration, 34 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 283, 283 (1996).
This article will refer to “differentiated integration” in the meaning of a term
used to “denote variations in the application of European policies or varia-
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One of the first models of differentiated integration emerged
from a series of articles published in 1973 by Ralph Dahrendorf, European Commissioner at that time.141 His proposal of
“integration à la carte” was based on the idea that no Member
State must participate in everything, an idea which has occasionally recurred in more recent years.
Only a few years later, in 1975, Tindemans, the European
federalist and Belgium Prime Minister, elaborated on a “multispeed Europe.” His report on the future of European integration considered differences among the (at that time) very large
nine Member States.142 Therefore, Tindemans held that whatever European target would be set in the future, different
Member States would never be able to reach them at the same
speed.

tions in the level and intensity of participation in European policy regimes,”
as specified by Helen Wallace, Differentiated Integration, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
THE EUROPEAN UNION 137–40 (D. Dinan ed., 1998). For a thorough analysis of
differentiated integration until 1996 and a very complete categorization, see
Stubb, supra note 140. For a more updated analysis, see generally WHICH
EUROPE?: THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENTIATED INTEGRATION (Kenneth Dyson &
Angelos Sepos eds., 2010).
141. The articles were published in “Die Zeit” under the pseudonym “Wieland Europa.” Dahrendorf’s idea of a Europe à la carte is summarized in his
“Jean Monnet Lecture” held at the European University Institute in Florence, on November 26, 1979. Many parts of the lecture are not only very inspiring, but in hindsight, prophetic:
I have often been struck by the prevailing view in Community circles
that the worst can happen is any movement towards what is called
Europe à la carte. This is not only somewhat odd for someone who
likes to make his own choices, but also illustrates that strange puritanism, not say masochism which underlies much of Community action: Europe has to hurt in order to be good.
Ralf Dahrendorf, Professor and Director of the London School of Economics,
Third Jean Monnet Lecture at the European University Institute in Florence:
A Third Europe? 19–20 (Nov. 26, 1979), http://aei.pitt.edu/11346/2/11346.pdf.
142. Report by Mr. Leo Tindemans to the European Council, BULLETIN OF
THE
EUROPEAN
COMMUNITIES
Supplement
1/76
(1976),
http://bookshop.europa.eu/en/european-union-pbCBNF76001/downloads/CBNF-76-001-ENC/CBNF76001ENC_001.pdf;pgid=Iq1Ekni0.1lSR0OOK4MycO9B0000sDOBx
6S2;sid=w_fvM0k3l1HvNx0PyZNxlCsSYTSTYv0v6c=?FileName=CBNF76001ENC_001.pdf&SKU=CBNF76001ENC_PDF&
CatalogueNumber=CB-NF-76-001-EN-C.
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The further “concentric circles” model is based on the idea of
a highly integrated European hard core and raised some interest since 1994, when France’s prime minister referred to it,143
followed by the “Schäuble-Lamers-Paper,”144 which has been
adopted by the Christian Democratic Union / Christian Social
Union Parliamentary Group in the German Parliament and
referred to a Kerneuropa. Aspects of this approach resurfaced
in 2000 in the avant-garde project favored by Joschka Fischer,145 whose challenge was accepted by Delors146 and Chirac147
and relaunched by Chirac and Schröder some years later.148
Another possible response to a growing heterogeneity of Europe is built on a European declination of James Buchanan’s
theory of clubs.149 Majone’s Europe as a “club of clubs”150 has
been theorized as a model of differentiated integration, which
aims at reducing the so-called costs of uniformity through a variety of institutional arrangements.151 One of the most relevant
implications of the application of this model would be the un143. See Interview of Edouard Balladur, French Prime Minister by Le Figaro (Aug. 30, 1994) (on file with author) (setting forth this idea for the first
time).
144. See Wolfgan Schauble & Karl Lamers, Reflections on European Policy,
in BUILDING EUROPEAN UNION 255, 255–63 (Trevor Solomon & William Nicoll
eds., 1997).
145. In a famous speech held in Berlin in 2000, Fischer reflected, among
other things, on a “centre of gravity” for Europe. Joschka Fischer, Speech at
the Humboldt University in Berlin (May 12, 2000), in FROM CONFEDERACY TO
FEDERATION: THOUGHTS ON THE FINALITY OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 13–14
(2000).
146. Jacques Delores, Europe Needs an Avant-Garde, But . . . , CTR. FOR
EUR.
REFORM
(Oct.
2,
2000),
http://www.cer.org.uk/publications/archive/bulletin-article/2000/europeneeds-avant-garde.
147. Jacques Chirac, Address to the Bundestag: Our Europe (June 27,
2000),
translation
at
http://www.cvce.eu/en/obj/address_given_by_jacques_chirac_to_the_bundesta
g_entitled_our_europe_berlin_27_june_2000-en-6a747c46-88db-47ec-bc8c55c8b161f4dc.html.
148. French President Chirac and German Chancellor Schröder referred to
the concept of a “core Europe” as a threat to move forward if the talks on the
draft of the CT would not be completed by the end of 2004. See WALTER VAN
GERVEN, THE EUROPEAN UNION: A POLITY OF STATES AND PEOPLES 6 (2005).
149. See generally James M. Buchanan, An Economic Theory of Clubs, 32
ECONOMICA 1 (1965).
150. MAJONE, supra note 137, at 113–17, 316–22.
151. See id. at 318.
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derstanding of the European Monetary Union as a “club good”
rather than a “collective good.” In other words, the Euro should
be transformed from a collective good imposed to all European
Members to a good from whose benefits and burdens the Member of the European club may be excluded or may choose to be
excluded.
Lately the possibility (and desirability) of a concentric development of the EU was envisaged in the proposal of a “Euro Area avant-garde” group.152 This de facto group is already imposing itself on the developments of the Euro crisis. The idea includes both elements of the concentric circles model and the
temporariness of the multispeed Europe model.
Whichever model of differentiated integration one considers,
a common denominator deserves attention: all the above mentioned examples (and many other models that have been theorized) are based on the assumption that flexibility is needed in
an ever larger and more socioeconomically heterogeneous union. The prescribed therapies may vary greatly, but there is a
broad agreement on the diagnosis: since Member States are
strikingly diverse in terms of socioeconomic conditions and political preferences, the one-size-fits-all model of European integration is too strict and largely inadequate. In this picture the
legal and constitutional diversity of the twenty-eight Member
States is hardly considered, and the diversity of constitutional
identities rarely appears as a possible source of differentiated
integration.
Comparing 1951 or 1957 Europe with 2015 Europe, the differences are not limited to the economic or political dimension.
The gap also grew also in constitutional terms, in particular
with regard to the unamendable core of Constitutions. The constitutional cultures of the six founding countries experienced
an unprecedented development, and the Union progressively
welcomed an increasing number of new members. New members whose constitutional traditions have very different roots if
compared with the ones of the founding countries, or whose
constitutional texts belong to very different constitutional generations. A growing constitutional variety has been registered
on two fronts. Under a static horizontal perspective, it is undeniable that the legal tradition of the six founding Member
States expressed more homogeneous legal cultures, when com152. See Piris, supra note 139, at 23.
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pared with the Member States that joined the Union in successive enlargements. When the latest enlargements of the EU
occurred in 2004 and 2007, the EU gradually embraced the
common law traditions of the United Kingdom, the Nordic
models of social State, and many postsocialist countries. Moreover, this diversity has to be combined with a vertical stratification of constitutional diversity. After World War II, a “flowering time”153 began, in which constitutional clauses provided
substantive limitations to constitutional amendment power.
Although both the idea and problem of limiting constitutional
amendment power was not new, it took a more centralized role
in postwar constitutional developments. In many cases the
“counter-limits” doctrines were founded upon the achievements
of these new developments in the field of the limits to constitutional amendment power.154 Against this background, “constitutional identity” has gradually developed as a unitary category that encompasses both limits to constitutional amendments
and counterlimits. This experience developed by means of explicit constitutional adjustments in very few countries. This
was the case of Europa-Artikel in the German Basic Law,155
which was introduced by means of a constitutional amendment
in 1992 and provides an explicit referral to the limits of constitutional amendment power.156 Essentially, according to these
combined provisions, the German Basic Law opposed the same
ultimate limits it opposed to the constitutional amendment
power to EU law. In several other Countries, the challenge to
unconditional normative freedom of constituted powers developed in the absence of Eternity Clauses.157 In the silence of the
constitution, constitutional limits to the constitutional amend-

153. For an overview of the time of flowering Eternity Clauses (the A. refers
to a “Blütezeit” in the original text), see KLAUS STERN, DAS STAATSRECHT DER
BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND BD. III/2. 1094 (1st ed. 1994).
154. See generally Patricia Popelier, “Europe Clauses” and Constitutional
Strategies in the Face of Multi-Level Governance, 21 MAASTRICHT J. EUR.
COMP. L. 300 (2014).
155. GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [BASIC LAW] art. 23, translation at
http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_gg/index.html. (Ger.).
156. GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [BASIC LAW] ART. 79.3.
157. On these developments, see, for example, Yaniv Roznai, Towards a
Theory of Unamendability (N.Y.U Sch. of Law Public Law & Legal Theory
Research
Paper
Series,
Working
Paper
No.
15-12,
2015),
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2569292.
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ment power have been an interpretative outcome of many constitutional courts’ case law.
The combination of these horizontal and vertical developments enhanced both the constitutional diversity and the constitutional rigidity of the untouchable cores of the Member
States’ constitutions. Alongside socioeconomic factors and political preferences, these constitutional developments deserve
consideration in the framework of differentiated integration.
B. Opt-outs, Derogations, and Legal Guarantees: a Europe of
Bits and Pieces?
It is against this background that differentiated integration
may be considered as a viable means of accommodation of nonshared features of Members States’ national constitutional
identities. Empirical evidence of the application of differentiated integration with this purpose may be drawn from the European experience and some pragmatic development in the last
twenty years. After decades of academic speculation and political debate, the Treaties of Maastricht and Amsterdam represented a significant turning point in the practice of differentiated integration in the EU. Indeed, enhanced cooperation was
incorporated in the structure of the treaties. Here, this article
not only refers to the proper institute of closer and enhanced
cooperation (firstly regulated in Article K.12 of the Treaty of
Amsterdam, later amended by the Nice and Lisbon Treaties),
but to a broader concept. This includes “in-built” forms of enhanced cooperation: (in)famously the Euro and the Schengen
Area.
These forms of enhanced cooperation started with the participation of a limited number of Member States, but were aimed
at including all EU-Member States.158 Legally speaking, decisions adopted in the Schengen159 and euro areas160 are part of

158. For a brief overview of these developments, see Carlo Maria Cantore,
We’re One, but We’re Not the Same: Enhanced Cooperation and the Tension
Between Unity and Asymmetry in the EU, 3 PERSP. ON FEDERALISM 1, 1–21
(2011).
159. The acquis of the 1985 Schengen Treaty on the gradual abolition of
common border checks was integrated into the EU framework by Protocol B
to the Treaty of Amsterdam, which was signed in 1997 and entered into force
in 1999. See Protocol Integrating the Schengen Acquis into the Framework of
the European Union, Treaty of Amsterdam, supra note 13, at 93.
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the acquis communautaire. The Schengen cooperation aims at
removing the checks on persons at internal borders and granting access to the Schengen Information System. In 1985, the
Schengen Area was founded outside of the European Community by means of an international agreement by five out of the
ten EU-Member States ratione temporis. It was incorporated in
the EU Treaties through the Amsterdam Treaty in 1999 and
has been an “in-built” mechanism of enhanced cooperation ever
since.161 Twenty-two out of the twenty-eight EU-Member States
have thus far joined. Four out of the six EU-Member States,
which are not part of the Schengen Area—Bulgaria, Croatia,
Cyprus, and Romania—are legally bound and wish to join the
area. Eventually, only Ireland and the United Kingdom will
maintain opt-outs.162
By contrast, the first steps towards a euro area were taken
within the framework of EU institutions. The Euro was meant
to become the common currency of the EU. The reluctance of
some Member States made things more complicated and, as
widely known, Denmark and the United Kingdom obtained a
permanent opt-out through the Treaty of Maastricht, whilst
Sweden obtained a de facto opt-out.163 All other Member States
are subject to the general principle that the Euro is the single
currency of all EU-Member States, although the participation

160. According to the Treaties, all Member States are obliged to adopt the
Euro. Only Member States benefiting from an opt-out (the United Kingdom
and Denmark) are excluded. Sweden benefits from a de facto opt-out. Member
States that joined the EU after the establishment of Economic and Monetary
Union (“EMU”), these Member States have committed to joining the euro
area as soon as they fulfill the entry conditions. When this is the case, the
“derogation” is “abrogated” by a decision of the Council, and the Member
State concerned adopts the euro.
161. On the absorption of the Schengen agreement into the Maastricht
Treaty and its meaning in terms of a policy of differentiated integration in
the EU, see Emek M. Uçarer, The Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, in
EUROPEAN UNION POLITICS 281, 286 (2016).
162. See infra pp. 538–544.
163. Under the 1994 Treaty of Accession, Sweden is obliged to join the Eurozone once it meets the requirement laid down by the Treaties. But Sweden
obtained that joining the second step of European Exchange Mechanism
(ERM) should be voluntary and subject to approval by a referendum. As accession to ERM is a condition to adopt the single currency, Sweden is de facto
still master of its own monetary destiny.
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in the Euro is conditional upon the fulfilment of the mandatory
convergence criteria,164 and subject to a decision of the Council.
That being said (also in light of some successive adjustments), the Treaty of Maastricht could be considered a qualitative leap from an older conception of the European integration
process to a newer one. Opt-outs and derogations can be seen
as inevitable side effects of this progress. Such an interpretation would give only a very partial picture of the 1992 European moment of truth.
As a matter of fact, the Treaty of Maastricht has also been a
turning point in the constitutional narrative of the European
integration process. As already mentioned, the Maastricht
Treaty included, for the first time, the respect of national identities in the wording of EU Treaties. The appearance of national identity in the Treaty of Maastricht was part of a more comprehensive balance between supranational achievements and
fears of a supranational entity overcoming the national State.
Against this background, it is not a matter of coincidence that
the Treaty of Maastricht marked a decisive milestone also in
the field of differentiated integration.165 The Treaty introduced
a set of protocols and declarations that addressed specific needs
of certain Member States, allowing for limited exemptions from
the acquis communautaire.166 This fragmentation has been de-

164. See TFEU art. 140; TFEU, Protocol No 13 on the Convergence Criteria,
at 281.
165. On the trade-off between enlargement of EU competences and flexibility, see Matej Avbelj, Revisiting Flexible Integration in Times of PostEnlargement and the Lustration of EU Constitutionalism, 4 CROAT. Y.B. EUR.
L. POL’Y 131, 139 (2008). For an assessment of the same trade-off after Lisbon, see Dobbs, supra note 22.
166. Nineteen protocols and thirty-three declarations were attached to the
Treaty of Maastricht. Many of these addressed specific matters concerning
one or more specific Member States. See, e.g., Protocol on the Acquisition of
Property in Denmark, in TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION 146 (Council and Commission of the European Communities eds., 1992); Protocol on Certain Provisions Relating to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,
in TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION 191 (Council and Commission of the European Communities eds., 1992); Protocol on Certain Provisions Relating to Denmark in TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION 194 (Council and Commission of the
European Communities eds., 1992). Full-text of the most important EU treaties are easily accessible at the europa.eu website. For the Treaty of Maastricht and its Protocols and Declarations, see http://europa.eu/eulaw/decision-
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scribed as a “significant blow to the vision of integration espoused by the classical narrative,”167 and a threat to the uniform application of EU law.168 In a more catastrophist view,
opt-outs and exemptions were able to open a Pandora’s Box
that could lead to the undesirable destiny of a “Europe of bits
and pieces.”169 Other commentators predicted no less than a
destructive disintegration of the EU.170 On the other side of the
fence are scholars who welcomed opt-outs as the necessary
means of building a new path towards differentiated integration.171 According to this view, there should be no single supreme authority (neither the national State nor the EU). Integrative and disintegrative dynamics should be accommodated
within the EU legal order and perspectives of differentiated
integration in a multilevel dimension are welcomed as a desirable and necessary development of a “post-sovereign” model.172
Whatever opinion one may have on these issues, the opt-outs
annexed to the Treaty of Maastricht have not been an isolated
experience of the recent European integration’s developments.
The negotiations between more or less integrationist Member
States frequently led to deadlocks, where “braking actors” may
operate as veto players. In these circumstances, there are three
making/treaties/pdf/treaty_on_european_union/treaty_on_european_union_en.pdf.
167. Matej Avbelj, Questioning European Union Constitutionalisms, in
COMPARATIVE LAW AS TRANSNATIONAL LAW: A DECADE OF THE GERMAN LAW
JOURNAL 389, 395 (Russell A. Miller & Peer Zumbansen eds., 2012).
168. Gráinne de Búrca & Joanne Scott, Introduction to CONSTITUTIONAL
CHANGE IN THE EU: FROM UNIFORMITY TO FLEXIBILITY 2, 3 (Gráinne de Búrca
& Joanne Scott eds., 2000).
169. See generally Deirdre Curtin, The Constitutional Structure of the Union: A Europe of Bits and Pieces, 30 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 17 (1993). The
metaphor already emerged in the EUI Working Paper by Joseph H.H. Weiler,
Supranationalism Revisited, a Retrospective: the European Communities after
30 years, in NOI SI MURA: SELECTED WORKING PAPERS OF THE EUROPEAN
UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE 341, 356–57 (Werner Maihofer ed., 1986).
170. Svein S. Andersen & Nick Sitter, Differentiated Integration: What is it
and How Much Can the EU Accommodate?, 28 J. EUR. INTEGR. 313, 314
(2006).
171. See Jo Shaw, European Union Legal Studies in Crisis? Towards a New
Dynamic, 16 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 231 (1996). See generally Renaud
Dehousse, Beyond Representative Democracy: Constitutionalism in a Polycentric Polity, in EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONALISM BEYOND THE STATE (Joseph H.H.
Weiler & Marlene Wind eds., 2003).
172. See generally NEIL MACCORMICK, QUESTIONING SOVEREIGNTY: LAW
STATE AND NATION IN THE EUROPEAN COMMONWEALTH (1999).
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possible ways out of the deadlock: 1) the controversial measure
may be abandoned, 2) the avant-garde states may accommodate the rearguard states by granting them opt-outs, exemptions, or derogations (a clear example is the Eurozone), or 3)
the avant-garde may step out of the EU framework and conclude a separate treaty (such as in the case of the Fiscal Compact and the European Stability Mechanism (ESM)).
The following sections will analyze a number of the most significant examples of differentiated integration. The analysis is
not exhaustive of all derogations in force, but rather aims at
addressing a reasonable number of case studies. The analysis
will mainly concentrate on authentic opt-outs. Where appropriate, other forms of derogations will be taken into account.
However, the analysis is limited to primary law. Due to the fact
that authentic opt-outs are currently in place in favor of the
United Kingdom, Ireland, and Denmark, we will proceed with a
country-by-country analysis.
1. United Kingdom
The United Kingdom is commonly recognized as an opt-out
champion. This idea is partly based on the United Kingdom’s
overall rough reputation as a euro-cynical-in-nature Member
State, and in part based on an accurate picture of the legal reality. The United Kingdom benefits from a special status in
many areas of the EU, and at least two of them lie in the core
of the integration project: Schengen and Euro.
The negative British attitude towards the border-free zone
dates back to the time of the conclusion of the (then) international agreement that Margaret Thatcher refused to sign.173
Since then, the stance has changed in many respects, but what
seems still today to be a total taboo is the very core of
Schengen, namely the common border policy. In 1997, a more
pro-European attitude of the British government allowed the
incorporation of the Schengen acquis into the Amsterdam
Treaty.174 This move came at a price in favor of the United
Kingdom, namely its nonparticipation. The United Kingdom
173. See Rebecca Adler-Nissen, Organized Duplicity? When States Opt Out
of the European Union, in SOVEREIGNTY GAMES: INSTRUMENTALIZING STATE
SOVEREIGNTY IN EUROPE AND BEYOND 81, 95 (Rebecca Adler-Nissen & Thomas
Gammeltoft-Hansen eds., 2008).
174. Id.
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was indeed granted an opt-out Protocol from Schengen, with a
limited degree of flexibility. The British Government could not
just pick the measures in which it considered to participate,
but could only request to take part in some or all of the provisions of the Schengen acquis.175
In March 1999, the United Kingdom applied to participate in
several measures, including the police and judicial cooperation
provisions and part of the Schengen Information System. This
request was approved by a Council Decision in 2000, and fully
implemented by a Decision of the Council of the EU starting on
January 1, 2005.176
Nonetheless, the core of the Schengen idea—the free border
zone—remained untouched and far over the Channel: “[a] significant majority on the domestic scene, led by Conservatives
and other eurosceptics, have ‘securitized’ the British Schengen
protocol to the extent that it appears to constitute a guarantee
of the survival of the British nation.”177
A second remarkable exemption obtained by the United
Kingdom concerns the single currency. Protocol No. 11 was annexed at the Treaty of Maastricht (now renumbered Protocol
No. 15) and recognizes “that the United Kingdom shall not be
obliged or committed to move to the third stage of Economic
and Monetary Union (“EMU”) without a separate decision to do
so by its government and Parliament.”178 Later, during the negotiations of the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997, the United Kingdom was granted an opt-out from what was the Justice and
Home Affairs (“JHA”) Pillar.179 The character of this derogation
was extremely flexible, allowing the United Kingdom to participate in EU measures on a case-by-case basis. After the dismantling of the three-pillars structure, the opt-out was re175. See Treaty of Amsterdam, supra note 13, Protocol on the Position of
the United Kingdom and Ireland arts. 3, 4.
176. See Council Decision 2000/365 of May 29, 2000 Concerning the Request
of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to Take Part in
Some of the Provisions of the Schengen acquis, 2000 O.J. (L 131) 43 (EC).
177. Rebecca Adler-Nissen, Behind the Scenes of Differentiated Integration:
Circumventing National Opt-outs in Justice and Home Affairs, 16 J. EUR.
PUB. POL’Y 62–80 (2009); see also Antje Wiener, Forging Flexibility: The British “No” to Schengen, 1 EUR. J MIGR. LAW 441, 446–47 (2000).
178. Protocol on Certain Provisions Relating to the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland, in TREATY ON THE EUROPEAN UNION 191 (Council and Commission of the European Communities eds., 1992).
179. See Council Decision 2000/365, supra note 176, at 99.
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newed in the area of freedom, security, and justice (“AFSJ”)
with the Treaty of Lisbon (Protocol No. 20). Additionally, according to Protocol No. 36,180 the United Kingdom had an allor-nothing choice to opt out of all acts of the Union in the field
of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters that have
been adopted before the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon.181 At which point, the United Kingdom would have been
able to opt in again in single measures on a case-by-case basis.
This all but plain procedure182 led to a full opt out of the United
Kingdom from the approximately 130 “ex-third-pillar”
measures in July 2014, after which the United Kingdom declared183 its wish to opt back into thirty five of these measures,
six of which are included in the Schengen acquis.184 Among
these are the chapters of the Schengen Convention on police
and judicial cooperation in criminal matters and the Schengen
Information System (SIS II, which is the police/justice body of
the Schengen data base). The remaining twenty-nine nonSchengen measures include the European Arrest Warrant, Europol, and Eurojust.185
180. Whereas Protocol No. 20, Treaty of Amsterdam, supra note 5, at 293,
concerns the application of certain aspect of the AFSJ to the United Kingdom
and Ireland, Article 10.4–.5 of Protocol No. 36, id. at 326–27, is only applicable to the United Kingdom. As a consequence, the Irish and British position
with regard to the possibility of opting-out and opting back in shall be considered separately.
181. Id. at 326.
182. On the details of the opt-out and in procedure, see Alicia Hinarejos,
John R. Spencer & Steve Peers, Opting Out of EU Criminal Law: What is
Actually Involved? (Ctr. for Eur. Legal Stud. Working Paper, New Series, No.
1,
2012),
http://resources.law.cam.ac.uk/cels/working_papers/eu_criminal_law_optout.p
df.
183. Council of the European Union Release 15398/14, Gen. Secretariat of
the Council, Notification of the United Kingdom under Article 10(5) of Protocol
36
to
the
EU
Treaties
(Nov.
27,
2014),
http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-15398-2014-INIT/en/pdf;
Council of the European Union Release 12750/13, Gen. Secretariat of the
Council, UK Notification According to Article 10(4) of Protocol No 36 to TEU
and TFEU (July 26, 2013), http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST12750-2013-INIT/en/pdf.
184. Council Directive 2014/857, art. 1, 2014 O.J. (L 345) 1 (EC).
185. Comm. of the Regions, Opinion on the “Proposal for Guidelines for
Member States’ Employment Policies 2000,” COM (1999) 441 final; List of
Union Act Adopted Before the Entry into Force of the Lisbon Treaty in the
Field of Police Cooperation and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters
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A different case is the United Kingdom’s opt-out in social policy. Its peculiarity lies in the fact that the British opt-out from
the social chapter is a ceased one. The opt-out was included in
Protocol No. 14 to the Maastricht Treaty, excluding the United
Kingdom from the EU decision-making procedures on social
rights’ implementation.186 Any legislation adopted in these
fields would not apply to the United Kingdom. Ultimately, the
differentiation terminated for a very simple reason, the Labor
Party won the elections, and the opt-out did not match the
United Kingdom’s new political orientation.187
2. Ireland
Ireland shares more than one opt-out with the United Kingdom. However, Ireland’s underlying reasons not to participate
in the concerned matters are very different from those of the
United Kingdom’s.188 The Irish position with regard to the
Schengen Agreement has always been strongly influenced by
the British reluctance to join the free-borders area. Irish accession to the Schengen Area without the United Kingdom would
have caused the end of the long established Common Travel

Which Cease to Apply to the United Kingdom as from 1 December 2014 Pursuant to Article 10(4), Second Sentence of Protocol (No 36) on Transitional
Provisions, 2014 O.J. (C 430) 17 (EC); List of Union Acts Adopted Before the
Entry into Force of the Lisbon Treaty in the Field of Police Cooperation and
Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters Which have Been Amended by an
Act Applicable to the United Kingdom Adopted After the Entry into Force of
the Lisbon Treaty and Which Therefore Remain Applicable to the United
Kingdom as Amended or Replaced, 2014 O.J. (C 430) 23 (EC).
186. Protocol on Certain Provisions Relating to the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland, in TREATY ON THE EUROPEAN UNION 191 (Council and Commission of the European Communities eds., 1992); see Protocol on
Social Policy, in TREATY ON THE EUROPEAN UNION 196, para. 2 (Council and
Commission of the European Communities eds., 1992).
187. The European Social Chapter took center stage in the British political
debate, both during its negotiation and adoption in 1991/92 and during the
electoral campaign in 1997. See SUSAN L. KANG, HUMAN RIGHTS AND LABOR
SOLIDARITY: TRADE UNIONS IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 149 (2012).
188. This dependency has long caused a lack of scholarly interest in Irish
opt-outs and derogations, because “so far Ireland mainly follows the UK” (Adler-Nissen, supra note 177 at 64.) and deserves little consideration. However,
things changed after the Irish stated “No” to the Lisbon Treaty and the subsequent negotiation of an “authentic” Irish protocol (see below in the body of
the text).
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Area189 between Ireland and the United Kingdom. This would
have imposed exit and entry controls on persons traveling
through the two countries, including the land frontier between
the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland.
As a result, Ireland was granted an opt-out with the United
Kingdom from the Schengen Area in a Protocol to the Amsterdam Treaty.190 The same Protocol provided both countries with
the possibility to request to take part in some or all of the provisions of the Schengen acquis.191 As far as police and judicial
cooperation provisions of the Schengen acquis are concerned,
Ireland applied to participate in June 2000. The Irish request
was approved by a Council Decision in 2002,192 but has not yet
been implemented.
Ireland joined the United Kingdom in Protocol No. 21 as well,
being granted an opt-out in the AFSJ.193 The Irish position
with regard to the AFSJ differs from the British position only
with regard to Article 10(4)(5) of Protocol 36. These provisions,
carrying out the complicated procedures of opting-out and selective opting back in at the end of the transitional period, only
apply to the United Kingdom.194
That being said, the most interesting position regarding Ireland is the Irish Protocol on the Lisbon Treaty. This Protocol
forms part of the agreement reached between the Heads of
State or Government after the negative Irish outcome in the
referendum on the Lisbon Treaty. To cut a long story short, the
Irish “No” seemed to cast the ill-fated CT’s shadows on the ratification procedure of the Lisbon Treaty. The “concerns of the

189. The Common Travel Area is a travel zone comprising Ireland, the
United Kingdom, the Isle of Man, and the Channel Islands, where internal
borders are subject to minimal or non-existent border controls.
190. See Treaty of Amsterdam, supra note 13, Protocol on the Position of
the United Kingdom and Ireland.
191. See id. arts. 3, 4.
192. See Council Decision 2002/192 of 28 Feb. 2002 Concerning Ireland’s
Request to Take Part in Some of the Provisions of Schengen Acquis, 2002 O.J.
(L 064) 20 (EC).
193. See, Dáil Éireann, Vol. 642 No. 2, HOUSE OF THE OIREACHTAS (Oct 24,
2007), http://oireachtasdebates.oireachtas.ie/. See also Maria Fletcher, EU
criminal justice: beyond Lisbon, in CRIME WITHIN THE AREA OF FREEDOM,
SECURITY AND JUSTICE: A EUROPEAN PUBLIC ORDER 10, 26 (Christina Eckes &
Theodore Konstadinides eds., 2011).
194. See supra note 182, on transitional provisions annexed to the TFEU.
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Irish people”195 were addressed with three instruments (informally called “the Guarantees”): a decision of the Heads of State
or Government of EU-Member States acting in their capacity
as sovereign states; a solemn declaration by the European
Council on workers’ rights, social policy, and other related issues; and a National Declaration by Ireland on Irish security
and defense policy.196 The first instrument was a legally binding international agreement and was adopted with the intention of transforming the decision into a protocol to the EU treaties with the adoption of the next Accession Treaty.197
The Protocol included three “clarifications.” First, it clarified
that the provisions of the Irish Constitution on the protection of
the right to life,198 family, and education would not be affected
by the Lisbon Treaty or the provisions of the CFREU. Second,
the Protocol confirmed that nothing in the Treaty of Lisbon
makes any change of any kind, for any Member State, to the
extent or operation of the competence of the EU in relation to
taxation. Third, the Protocol provided a clarification that Ireland’s traditional policy in military neutrality will remain un-

195. These concerns were collected in the findings of a governmentcommissioned public survey about the reasons for the “No” vote in the Irish
Referendum. The survey was conducted six weeks after the vote, and indicated among these reasons, a “lack of knowledge/information/understanding” of
the Treaty; concerns about the “loss” of an Irish commissioner after the
planned reduction of the number of Commissioners; the threat to the traditional Irish neutrality and possible military implications, such as a conscription to a European army; and finally the threats to the right to life of the unborn. In the same survey, the Irish electorate held as very important the protection of workers’ rights, the national control over public services, and corporation taxation rates. See DAVID PHINNEMORE, THE TREATY OF LISBON:
ORIGINS AND NEGOTIATION 190 (2013).
196. For an overview of the content of the “Guarantees”, see INST. OF
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS, LISBON: THE IRISH GUARANTEES EXPLAINED (2009),
http://www.iiea.com/publications/lisbon-the-irish-guarantees-explained.
197. The Protocol was approved in Section 2 of the Treaty of Accession of
Croatia, Act Concerning the Conditions of Accession of the Republic of Croatia and the Adjustments to the Treaty on European Union, the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European union and the Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, Apr. 24, 2012, 2012 O.J. (L 112) 21, and was
then drafted as a separate document, entering into force on December 1,
2014.
198. Note that the Irish Protocol on abortion constitutional policies, which
has been in force since 1993, remains unaffected.
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changed and unaffected by the Treaty.199 Additionally, a separate agreement was reached among the Member States to reassure Irish concerns about the possible loss of a Commission
representative, along with the planned reduction in its size.200
3. Denmark
Denmark was granted a number of exemptions and derogations from Maastricht to Lisbon, so many to the extent that it
has been described as “a smart state handling a differentiated
integration dilemma.”201 In 1991, the final draft of the Maastricht Treaty gave Denmark the right to decide if and when
they would join the Euro.202 An initial referendum was called
on the entire Maastricht Treaty at the beginning of the following year, and resulted in a narrow “No.” Afterwards, a national
compromise established that the Social Democratic Party, the
Socialist People’s Party, and the Social Liberal Party would
agree on a position that claimed the opt-out from single currency as the highest national priority.203 This position proved successful, and the agreement on the Euro opt-out was included in
the 1992 Edinburgh Agreement, a Council decision that followed the Danish negative outcome on the Maastricht referendum.204 Actually, the agreement granted Denmark four optouts, concerning not only the third stage of the EMU but also

199. See Protocol on the concerns of the Irish people on the Treaty of Lisbon, art. 3, 2013 O.J. (L60/132).
200. The agreement to maintain the number of Commissioners equal to the
number of Member States was reached in the European Council at its meeting on December 11 and 12, 2008.
201. Lee Miles & Anders Wivel, A smart State Handling a Differentiated
Integration Dilemma?, in DENMARK AND THE EUROPEAN UNION, 228, 237 (Lee
Miles & Anders Wivel eds., 1st ed. 2014).
202. For an overview of the troubled relation between Denmark and the
single currency, see Martin Marcussen, Denmark and the Euro opt-out, in
DENMARK AND THE EUROPEAN UNION 47, 49 (Lee Miles & Anders Wivel eds.,
1st ed. 2014).
203. See Morten Kelstrup, Denmark’s Relation to the European Union, in
DENMARK AND THE EUROPEAN UNION 14, 17 (Lee Miles & Anders Wivel eds.,
2014).
204. The “Edinburgh Agreement” is an agreement reached at a European
Council meeting held in Edinburgh on December 11 and 12, 1992, that granted Denmark four exemptions to the Treaty of Maastricht. See Presidency
Conclusions, Edinburgh European Council (Dec. 11–12,, 1992),
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/edinburgh/b3_en.pdf.
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the Common Security and Defense Policy, the JHA, and the
citizenship of the Union.205
A new referendum on the Maastricht Treaty was called on
May 19, 1993, resulting in an approval by 56.7 percent of voters. As far as the Euro opt-out is concerned, when the third
stage of EMU started on January 1, 1999, the Danish Government decided to call for a new referendum on the abolition of
the opt out.206 However, the Danish voters rejected once more
the full participation to the EMU.207 Since the beginning of the
Euro Crisis in 2008, full Danish participation in the EMU
seems a far-off prospect.
The repeated rejection to join the third phase of the EMU
bears some peculiarities and merits special attention. For
many years, governing parties have all been in favor of overcoming the Euro opt-out208 and it has been considered “technically unproblematic for Denmark to sign up for the Europhilosophy.”209 The reluctance to join the EMU was the result
of a combination of factors, which gave birth to the Danish approach to important EU-related decisions, requiring an open
and wide debate and eventually a referendum. This should be
the way to manage essential EU-related issues, “irrespective of
the attitude of the majority of the parliament.”210
The economic dimension of the opt-out or in policy, obviously
played an important role, but it was not the only factor that
was taken into consideration, since there was no one right answer to the matter. Besides the economic dimension of the decision, other forces pushed in the direction of the opt-out, namely
the fact that the euro was not seen “only as a mean of payment” but also “as an expression of national identity and sovereignty.”211
205. This article will not elaborate on all the Danish opt-outs, but will focus
only on the Euro and the AFSJ opt-outs.
206. A referendum on the termination of the Euro opt-out was called in
2000. For an overview of the political debate raised by the referendum, see
Marcussen, supra note 202, at 49.
207. Only a minority of 46.8 percent of the voting population supported
Danish full participation in the EMU. See data reported by Morten Kelstrup,
Denmark’s Relation to the European Union, in DENMARK AND THE EUROPEAN
UNION 14–29, 16 (Lee Miles & Anders Wivel eds., 2014).
208. Marcussen, supra note 202, at 52.
209. Id. at 48.
210. Id. at 48.
211. Id. at 55.
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A similar feeling still seems to pervade the Danish understanding of the opt-out from the (then) JHA.212 The opt-out was
included in the Edinburgh package and survived through the
“semi-permanent Treaty revision process.”213 Nonetheless, the
European normative framework in the area has changed significantly and against this new background the opt-out takes on
an entirely new significance.
The 1992 opt-outs were an expression of the refusal of a federal Europe and left the door open to intergovernmental cooperation, which was in any case the rule in the form of third pillar matters. Indeed, Denmark’s full participation in cooperating on JHA was expressly stated in the Edinburgh Agreement.214 The turning point came in 1997 with the Amsterdam
Treaty and the supranationalization of important matters,
such as asylum, immigration, border control, and civil law policies. Except for criminal law and police cooperation, areas
where the intergovernmental method still applied, Denmark
was left out from many JHA policy areas.
With the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, the potential impact
of the Danish opt-out had dramatically increased. The dismantling of the pillars’ system had the consequence of excluding
Denmark from the areas where intergovernmental methods
still applied before Lisbon. The former JHA opt-out currently
appears under Protocol No. 22 to the treaties.215 First of all, it
provides that Denmark is bound by the Schengen rules (Den212. According to Adler-Nissen, “[t]he opt-out remains an important symbol
of autonomy for large parts of the Danish population.” Rebecca Adler-Nissen,
Justice and Home Affairs: Denmark as an Active Differential European, in
DENMARK AND THE EUROPEAN UNION 65, 67 (Lee Miles & Anders Wivel eds.,
2014); see also Lene Hansen, Sustaining Sovereignty: The Danish Approach to
Europe, in EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND NATIONAL IDENTITY: THE CHALLENGE
OF THE NORDIC STATES 50–87 (Lene Hansen & Ole Wæver eds., 2002).
213. Bruno de Witte, The Closest Thing to a Constitutional Conversation in
Europe: The Semi-Permanent Treaty Revision Process, in CONVERGENCE AND
DIVERGENCE IN EUROPEAN PUBLIC LAW 39–59 (P. R. Beaumont, Carole Lyons
& Neil Walker eds., 2002).
214. Section D of TFEU Annex 1, which is entitled, “Decision of the Heads
of State and Government, Meeting within the European Council, Concerning
Certain Problems Raised by Denmark on the Treaty on European Union,”
provides that “Denmark will participate fully in cooperation on Justice and
Home Affairs on the basis of the provisions of title VI of the Treaty on European Union.” See Denmark and the Treaty on European Union, 1992 O.J. (C
348) 1, 2.
215. See TFEU Protocol No 22 on the Position of Denmark, at 384, art. 2.
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mark joined the Schengen Agreement in 1996), but only under
international law (which means that CJEU’s jurisdiction does
not apply).216 Conversely, Denmark is not bound by any other
provision of (or adopted pursuant to) Title V of Part Three of
the TFEU (immigration and asylum law, or civil cooperation).217 Denmark is bound by acts of the Union in the field of
police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters adopted before the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, but it is not
bound by acts in these areas if adopted after the entry into
force of the Treaty of Lisbon.
Finally, the opt-out protocol is coupled with an “autotermination clause” that allows Denmark to renounce the optout, or even transform it into a selective opt-out or opt-in, following the British and Irish Model.218 The opt-in needs referendum approval, which recent Danish history has shown to be
insidious. The Danish Prime Minister has recently announced
such a referendum, considering the fact that Europol reform
would have excluded the Country’s participation from that
measure, in virtue of the provisions of Protocol 22.219 The referendum was held on December 3, 2015 and 53 percent of Danes
216. According to article 2 of protocol number 22, “[N]o decision of the Court
of Justice of the European Union interpreting” any provision “of Title V of
Part Three of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,” any
measure “adopted pursuant to that Title,” any “provision of any international
agreement concluded by the Union pursuant to that Title,” “or any measure
amended or amendable pursuant to that Title shall be binding upon or applicable in Denmark.” See TFEU, Protocol No 22 on the Position of Denmark, at
384, art. 2.
217. Denmark concluded parallel agreements with the EU in some of these
areas, such as the Dublin rules on asylum applications, the Brussels Regulation on civil and commercial jurisdiction, and the Regulation on service of
documents.
218. According to article 7 of protocol number 22,
[a]t any time Denmark may, in accordance with its constitutional requirements, inform the other Member States that it no longer wishes
to avail itself of all or part of this Protocol. In that event, Denmark
will apply in full all relevant measures then in force taken within
the framework of the European Union.
See TFEU, Protocol No 22 on the Position of Denmark, art. 7.
219. The referendum was called by the Danish Prime Minister Lars Loekke
Rasmussen on August 21, 2015. See Kirk Lisbeth, Danes to Vote on EU Relations in December Referendum, EU OBSERVER (Aug. 21, 2015 7:29 PM),
https://euobserver.com/beyond-brussels/129950.
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voted “No” to joining EU JHA policies, confirming the insidious
character of opt-in referendums.220
According to the outlined framework, Denmark seems like
one of the most mistrusted and reluctant Member States.
Denmark certainly “profited” from some of its arrangements of
differentiated integration, mainly through different policies on
certain issues. In particular, with regard to the asylum and
immigration conundrum, the opt-out left room to adopt strict
policies regarding asylum and family reunification.
However, an in-depth analysis of the Danish policies in many
other fields where Denmark retained an opt-out showed the
opposite. In almost every aspect of the former JHA pillar, Danish authorities adopted legislative policies that are perfectly
consistent with EU law policies. A “systematic mimicking and
copying of EU legislation”221 has been revealed in many areas,
making Denmark an “active copycat.”222 Informal harmonization, parallel agreements, and mimicking EU regulation makes
Denmark more of “a rule-taker” than “a rule-maker.”223
4. The Curious Case of the United Kingdom, Poland, Czech Republic, and the CFREU
It is not uncommon to find in the category of opt-outs, the
British and Polish Protocol concerning the CFREU. During the
negotiations on the Lisbon Treaty, the United Kingdom and
Poland insisted upon a special Protocol to the Treaties regarding the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (EUCFR), which
was finally annexed to the Treaty (Protocol No. 30).224 The
220. Results showed 53.1 percent had voted “no,” while 46.9 percent had
voted “yes.” See Folkeafstemning Torsdag 3. December 2015, DANMARKS
STATISTIK, http://www.dst.dk/valg/Valg1664255/valgopg/valgopgHL.htm (last
updated Dec. 4, 2015).
221. Adler-Nissen, supra note 212, at 69.
222. Id. at 69.
223. Id.
224. The Czech Republic was not initially included in Protocol 30. After the
insistence of President Václav Klaus—who affirmed that Czech Republic
would have refused to ratify the Treaty unless the Country would have been
added to the Protocol, see David Charter, I will not sign Lisbon Treaty, says
(Oct.
13,
2009),
Czech
President,
TIMES
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/europe/article6871365.ece—EU
leaders agreed to amend the protocol at the time of the next accession Treaty
(Croatia). The amendment was drafted and the procedure started, see Council
of the European Union meeting held in Brussels Oct. 29–30, 2009 (Conclu-
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wording of the Protocol consisted in a normative puzzle, including a relatively long preamble and two substantive provisions,
aiming at limiting the application of the EUCFR in the United
Kingdom and Poland.225
The situation is partially different when compared with previous opt-outs. Indeed, qualification of the Protocol as a proper
opt-out has been controversial from the outset. Nowadays a
major part of the legal literature,226 supported by and supportsions
available
at
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/11088
9.pdf), but successively the very Czech Republic withdrew the request. In
May 2014, the Council formally acknowledged the Czech withdrawal for a
quasi-opt-out from the EUCFR. See Council of the European Union Press
Release
9545/14,
3313th
Council
Meeting
(May
13,
2014),
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/genaff/1
42581.pdf. On these developments, see Miloš Kulda, Charter of Fundamental
Rights of the European Union and the Legal Order of the Czech Republic, I
UNIV.
PRAGUE
FAC.
LAW
RES.
PAP.
(2015),
CHARLES
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2596764.
225. The United Kingdom and Poland were guaranteed by the following
provisions:
Article 1: 1. The Charter does not extend the ability of the Court of
Justice of the European Union, or any court or tribunal of Poland or
of the United Kingdom, to find that the laws, regulations or administrative provisions, practices or action of Poland or of the United
Kingdom are inconsistent with the fundamental rights, freedoms
and principles that it reaffirms.
Article 1: 2. In particular, and for the avoidance of doubt, nothing in
Title IV of the Charter creates justiciable rights applicable to Poland
or the United Kingdom except in so far as Poland or the United
Kingdom has provided for such rights in its national law.
Article 2: To the extent that a provision of the Charter refers to national laws and practices, it shall only apply to Poland or the United
Kingdom to the extent that the rights or principles that it contains
are recognised in the law or practices of Poland or of the United
Kingdom.
Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, Protocol (No 30)
on the Application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European
Union to Poland and to the United Kingdom, May 9, 2008, 2008 O.J.
(C115) 13, 314.
226. Steve Peers, The “Opt-out” that Fell to Earth: The British and Polish
Protocol Concerning the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, 12 HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 375, 384 (2012); Ingolf Pernice, The Treaty of Lisbon and Fundamental
Rights, in THE LISBON TREATY 235, 244–49 (Stefan Griller & Jacques Ziller
eds., 2008); Catherine Barnard, The “Opt-Out” for the UK and Poland from
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ing the CJEU227 case law, tends to exclude that Protocol No. 30
provides an opt-out from the EUCFR in favor of the United
Kingdom and Poland.
Nonetheless, it is interesting to investigate the reasons behind the negotiation of the Protocol. Simply put, the Protocol to
the Charter has been “an exercise in smoke and mirrors.”228 In
the “British Protocol,” No. 30 has been presented to the Eurosceptic audience as a proper opt-out, but has never been interpreted in this manner by the British Government. Official
statements of the Government’s branches openly stated that
“the UK Protocol does not constitute an ‘opt-out’.”229 In this respect, it has been noted that “these opt-outs imply an outright
rejection of political integration”230 and seem to be “purely political phenomena.”231 This is, however, questionable. As a matter of fact, the (then) Prime Minister Tony Blair’s words seem
to refer to something more serious than a political tantrum.
Explaining the reasons for the opt-out, Blair referred to the
“long and difficult memories of the battles fought to get British

the Charter of Fundamental Rights: Triumph of Rhetoric over Reality?, in
THE LISBON TREATY 257, 276–80 (Stefan Griller & Jacques Ziller eds., 2008);
PAUL CRAIG, THE LISBON TREATY: LAW, POLITICS, AND TREATY REFORM 237–40
(2010).
227. The CJEU clearly stated that Protocol No. 30 “does not call into question the applicability of the Charter in the United Kingdom or in Poland” and
that “it does not intend to exempt the Republic of Poland or the UK from the
obligation to comply with the provision of the Charter.” Case C-411/10, N.S.
v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, 2011 E.C.R. I-13991, ¶¶ 119–
20.
228. Barnard, supra note 226, at 281.
229. House of Lords EU Select Committee, The Treaty of Lisbon: An Impact
Assessment, 10th Report of Session 2007-08, HL Paper 62-I, para. 5.86. In
fact, the exact words, “the UK-specific protocol is not an ‘opt-out,’” were used
by Jim Murphy, the Minister for Europe in his address to the House of Commons’ European Scrutiny Committee. See European Union Intergovernmental Conference, House of Commons Eur. Scrutiny Comm., Thirty-fifth Report
of
Session
2006–07,
para.
57,
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmselect/cmeuleg/1014/1
014.pdf.
230. GIANDOMENICO MAJONE, EUROPE AS THE WOULD-BE WORLD POWER THE
EU AT FIFTY 217 (2009).
231. This article will dwell on the category of “purely political phenomena”
more deeply. See infra Conclusion.
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law in proper order”232 in the areas addressed by the Charter,
and not to his Government’s political preferences. As a matter
of fact, the opt-out may come as a surprise, if one considers
that negotiations have been conducted by a government run by
the Labor Party, whose origins lie in the workers movement.233
This would suggest that British concerns were not “purely political phenomena,” but that they expressed a deeper constitutional understanding.
The paradoxical position of Poland was even more evident.
The most recent history of the country was deeply rooted in the
struggles of the social movement solidarity for social and labor
rights. Therefore, the Polish Government’s reluctance in front
of the CFREU could be considered inconsistent with Polish recent national history, provided that Title IV of the Charter
aimed at further developing these rights in the EU. The Government expressed its embarrassment in a declaration enclosed to the Lisbon Treaty:
Poland declares that, having regard to the tradition of social
movement of “Solidarity” and its significant contribution to
the struggle for social and labor rights, it fully respects social
and labor rights, as established by European Union law, and
in particular those reaffirmed in Title IV of the Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union.234

This suggests that the Polish position on the EUCFR was not
a “purely political phenomena,” or at least that the Polish quasi
opt-out was not expressing a political preference in the field of
social and labor rights. In the opinion of an authoritative part
of the legal scholarship, this apparent paradox is explained by
Poland’s fear residing in other areas, such as family law, specifically with regard to same-sex couple regulation.235
232. The British position was summed up by Tony Blair in his Cardiff
Speech of November 2002. See FINN LAURSEN, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE EU’S
CONSTITUTIONAL TREATY 211 (2008).
233. For a detailed history of the British Labor Party, see ANDREW THORPE,
A HISTORY OF THE BRITISH LABOUR PARTY (2008).
234. See Consolidated Versions of the Treaty on European Union and the
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Declaration by the Republic of Poland Concerning the Protocol on the Application of the Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union in Relation to Poland and the
United Kingdom, 2012 O.J. (C 236) 1, 360.
235. According to Barnard, “Poland’s concerns are not with social and labor
rights. Poland’s real fears lie with subjects such as gay marriage and abortion
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5. Identity-tailored Protocols?
Besides the relatively (in)famous opt-outs previously analyzed, various protocols, opt-outs, and derogations have been
adopted in the history of European integration. Nonetheless,
they have little or no effect on understanding Member States’
constitutional identity. Protocol No. 3 on the Treaty of Accession of Sweden, granting to the Sami people an exclusive right
to reindeer husbandry, certainly provides a derogation of fundamental freedoms of the Treaty.236 This does not automatically mean that reindeer husbandry is part of the constitutional
identity of Sweden.
The matter seems to have been treated differently with respect to the Treaty of Maastricht, which introduced a set of
protocols. Some of these addressed national interests of certain
Member States, and one could argue that the protocols consisted of preventative measures to avoid future conflicts. The ease
with which narrowly tailored Protocols had been conceded in
the Maastricht agreements was severely criticized at that
time.237 As a result, a potential hijacking of the acquis communautaire has been denounced and a “Europe of bits and Pieces”238 has been deplored. However, three of the protocols were
questioned more than the others.239
Protocol No. 17 (the “Grogan Protocol”) provided that “nothing in the TEU, or in the Treaties establishing the European
Communities, or in the Treaties or Acts modifying or supplementing those Treaties, shall affect the application in Ireland
of Article 40.3.3. of the Constitution of Ireland.”240 This provision originated from the famous Grogan judgment of the

but the Protocol (and the Charter) do not touch on these.” See Barnard, supra
note 226, at 276.
236. Act Concerning the Conditions of Accession of the Kingdom of Norway,
the Republic of Austria, the Republic of Finland and the Kingdom of Sweden
and the Adjustments to the Treaties on Which the European Union is Founded, Protocol No. 3 on the Sami People, 1994 O.J. (C 241) 21, 352.
237. See, e.g., Curtin, supra note 169.
238. Curtin, supra note 169.
239. For an analysis of these protocols against the background of national
constitutional identity, see Giuseppe Martinico, What Lies Behind Article 4(2)
TEU?, in NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL IDENTITY AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 93,
100 (2013).
240. Treaty on European Union and to the Treaties establishing the European Communities, Protocol, 1992 O.J. (C 224) 130.
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ECJ.241 The case dealt with student organizations publishing in
the Republic of Ireland—whose Constitution protects the right
to life of the unborn—the names, addresses, and phone numbers of abortion clinics in Great Britain. The ECJ had neither
reason, nor jurisdiction to decide on the legality of abortion, but
the Court held that the medical termination of pregnancy constituted a service within the meaning of Article 60 of the Treaty. Nonetheless, the ECJ held that it is not contrary to EU law
for Ireland to prohibit distributing information about abortion
clinics. According to the ECJ’s view, Member States are allowed deference to restrict free movement of services for “justified public policy reasons.” Nonetheless, this judicial saga
pushed Ireland to negotiate a permanent protocol to protect its
constitutional protection of the right to life of the unborn. Protocol No. 17 was the European response to Irish fears.242
A similar path was followed by Denmark in regard to the
Danish Second Home Protocol. Protocol No. 1 of the Treaty of
Maastricht neutralized any possible clash with Danish legislation, prohibiting acquisitions of second homes in Denmark by
non-Danish people and Community law. The protocol provided
that “notwithstanding the provisions of this Treaty, Denmark
may maintain the existing legislation on the acquisition of second homes,”243 granting a permanent derogation from the principle of nondiscrimination on the basis of citizenship. Three
years earlier, in 1989, the ECJ held that restrictions applied by
a Member State to nationals of other Member States in regard
to the acquisition and enjoyment of rights in immovable property are contrary to Community law.244
Finally, Protocol No. 2 (the Barber Protocol), introduced a
very specific and permanent derogation from the acquis communautaire.245 The Member States that pushed most to intro-

241. Case C-159/90, Society for the Protection of Unborn Children Ireland
Ltd. v. Stephen Grogan and Others, 1991 E.C.R. 4685.
242. As mentioned above, the Protocol was renewed and confirmed in the
Lisbon Treaty, and the same issue was the object of reassurances in “the
Guarantees” after the Irish “No” in the referendum on ratification.
243. Treaty on European Union (Maastricht text), July 29, 1992, 1992 O.J.
(C 191) 1, Protocol No. 1 (regarding the acquisition of property in Denmark).
244. Case C-305/87, Commission v. Greece, 1989 E.C.R. 1476; Case C186/87, Cowan v. Trésor Public, 1989 E.C.R. 195.
245. Protocol No. 2 states that
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duce the Protocol were those States where the impact of a decision that the ECJ246 delivered some years earlier could have
been financially remarkable.
These examples illustrate that protocols not only have been
used to accommodate disagreements on the participation of
Member States in entire policies (such as the single currency,
the free-border zone, or the former third pillar), but also to address very specific concerns. Although the Grogan Protocol may
be considered the only Protocol with an evident connection with
constitutional values, the tailoring method adopted in the
aforementioned three cases is highly significant as a plausible
means of conflict neutralization.
C. Opt-Outs, Declarations, and Legal Guarantees: Between Political Opportunism and Sincere Constitutional Concerns
As far back as 1984, Claus-Dieter Ehlermann drew a fundamental distinction in the analysis of flexibility arrangements in
the (then) Community law. Ehlermann discerned between economic and social factors on the one hand, and purely “political
phenomena”247 on the other. According to his view, only the
former could in principle justify differentiation. The author
chose only one example, which reveals itself as extraordinarily
telling thirty years later: “for instance, the fact that the British
government (or the majority in Parliament or even public opinion in the United Kingdom) is opposed to joining the European

for the purposes of Article 119 of this Treaty, benefits under occupational social security schemes shall not be considered as remuneration if and in so far as they are attributable to periods of employment
prior to 17 May 1990, except in the case of workers or those claiming
under them who have before that date initiated legal proceedings or
introduced an equivalent claim under the applicable national law.
Council Directive 96/97, 1997 O.J. (L 46) 20, 20 (EC) (amending Directive
86/378, 1996 O.J. (L 225) 40 (EEC) (regarding the implementation of the
principle of equal treatment for men and women in occupational social security schemes)).
246. Case C-262/88, Douglas Harvey Barber v. Guardian Royal Exch. Assurance Grp., 1990 E.C.R. I-01889, ¶¶ 1–5.
247. Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, How Flexible Is Community Law? An Unusual Approach to the Concept of “Two Speeds,” 82 MICH. L. REV. 1274, 1289
(1984).
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monetary system would not be a valid argument for differentiation.”248
Almost thirty years later, the United Kingdom did not join
the third stage of the EMU, precisely because the British Government, the majority of the Parliament, and public opinion in
the United Kingdom opposed the single currency. It may be
that Ehlermann was right and the EU was wrong. In other
words, it can be argued that the differentiation conceded to the
United Kingdom was unjustified from the outset. Alternatively,
perhaps Ehlermann was mistaken in the sense that what he
identified as a purely political phenomenon (the U.K. opt-out
from the single currency) was not. In the second scenario, we
should reformulate his words and assume that the fact that in
one Member State the government, the majority in Parliament,
or even public opinion opposes a further step in the process of
European integration should be held as a valid argument for
differentiation.
What deserves special attention is the identification of what
accounts for “purely political phenomena.” It is certainly true
that special arrangements in favor of specific Member States
are based on very different justifications. For purposes of this
article, it is highly significant to discern the diverse nature of
the “valid argument for differentiation.” Beside socioeconomic
factors and “purely political phenomena,” this article argues for
the possible existence of valid constitutional arguments for differentiation. It may not be easy to discern between political and
constitutional reasons for differentiation, especially in the case
of the United Kingdom, where there is no formal document to
look toward. Nonetheless, the assumption that the British optout from the single currency is a purely political phenomenon is
highly debatable. If the opposition to the single currency was a
purely political phenomenon, twenty-five years of changing
governments would have at some point led the United Kingdom
in the opposite political direction. A political change of mind
regarding the single currency issue would have resulted in the
same outcome as when the United Kingdom opted out of the
social chapter. This opt-out was certainly based on a purely political phenomenon. As a matter of fact, in 1997, when the Labour Party’s victory in the general elections caused the over-

248. Id.
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turning of the contingent decision to opt-out of the social chapter, the United Kingdom opted back in.249
Nonetheless, one could still argue that specific Member
States, which were granted an opt-out on the basis of “purely
political phenomena,” are impeded to opt back in even if governments and political preferences change, because some optouts become a totem in public opinion. In these cases, Member
States have developed extensive experience in “circumventing”
the opt-outs. If the structure of the specific opt-out is flexible
enough to admit case-by-case opt-ins, Member States extensively use opt-ins to erode their nonparticipation in the policy
areas in question. The United Kingdom has been a champion in
“getting the best of both worlds.”250 For example, in regard to
the opt-out from the former third pillar, the United Kingdom
opted into most civil law measures, asylum matters, and
measures on illegal immigration. When the opt-out is rigid and
does not allow for a “picking and choosing” strategy, internal
legislation mimicking EU regulations or parallel intergovernmental agreements, have been widely used to void opt-outs in
substance.251
249. See, e.g., Adler-Nissen, supra note 177 at 68; JOSÉ MARÍA BENEYTO
JULIA BAQUERO, BELÉN BECERRIL, MICHAEL BOLLE, MARISE CREMONA, SÖNKE
EHRET, VICENTE LÓPEZ-IBOR, JERÓNIMO MAILLO, UNITY AND FLEXIBILITY IN THE
FUTURE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION: THE CHALLENGE OF ENHANCED COOPERATION
43 (2009).
250. It was Prime Minister Tony Blair who affirmed on October 25, 2004,
that
there is no question of Britain giving up our veto on our border controls. In the Treaty of Amsterdam seven years ago we secured the
absolute right to opt in to any of the asylum and immigration provisions that we wanted to in Europe. Unless we opt in, we are not affected by it. And what this actually gives us is the best of both
worlds. We are not obliged to have any of the European rules here,
but where we decide in a particular area, for example to halt the
trafficking in people, for example to make sure that there are proper
restrictions on some of the European borders that end up affecting
our country, it allows us to opt in and take part in these measures.
Blair Defends EU Plans to Drop Asylum Veto, TELEGRAPH (Oct. 25, 2004, 9:47
AM),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/1475025/Blair-defends-EU-plans-todrop-asylum-veto.html. On “getting the best” British attitude, see generally
Andrew Geddes, Getting the Best of Both Worlds? Britain, the EU and Migration policy, 81 INT’L AFF. 723 (2005).
251. The Danish experience offers a good example of this substantial circumvention of opt-outs. See supra Part II.
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III. CONSTITUTIONAL IDENTITY BETWEEN COOPERATION,
MISTRUST, AND SUBSIDIARITY
Insofar, this article has investigated differentiated integration as a means to neutralize conflicts between EU law and certain characteristics of a Member State’s national constitutional
identity. This approach revealed unexplored aspects of both the
concept of national constitutional identity and of differentiated
integration. The latter seems able to play a role as a method of
“self-enforcement”252 of the Identity Clause. Nevertheless, differentiated integration is only one of many possible methods of
“self-enforcement,” or to be more exact, of nonjudicial enforcement of the Identity Clause. In the present section, we will investigate three further alternatives: the rule of unanimity as a
safeguard of Member States’ interests in identity-sensitive policy areas; enhanced cooperation as a way out of political deadlocks when identity-related interests of certain Member States
are at stake; and the principle of subsidiarity as a privileged
forum to investigate the understanding of national constitutional identity by nonjudicial national players.
A. Unanimity: a Clue of Constitutional Identity-Sensitive Matters
The increasing application of majority voting has been widely
considered one of the indicators of successful European integration. Starting from the Single European Act in 1986, a set of
reforms gradually extended the field of qualified majority voting (“QMV”) within the Council of Ministers.253 Lately, the
Treaty of Lisbon further extended the application of the
QMV.254 Against the background of these developments, the
rule of unanimity voting has been held as an obstacle to the
desirable target of an efficient decisional process. The rule of
unanimity implies rigidity and has been considered an expression of mutual mistrust between Member States. In regard to
252. This terminology is excerpted from CLOOTS, supra note 6, at 39.
253. For an overview of the gradual extension of QMV, ANDREAS DUR ET AL.,
NEGOTIATION THEORY AND THE EU: THE STATE OF THE ART 28 (2013); PHILIPPA
SHERRINGTON, COUNCIL OF MINISTERS: POLITICAL AUTHORITY IN THE EUROPEAN
UNION 175 (2000).
254. For a detailed analysis of areas where QMV applies after the adoption
of the Treaty of Lisbon, see generally Stephen C. Sieberson, Inching Toward
EU Supranationalism? Qualified Majority Voting and Unanimity Under the
Treaty of Lisbon, 50 VA. J. INT’L L. 919–96 (2010).
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constitutional identity, one should take into account this “mistrust argument.” It is in fact plausible that Member States can
be very reluctant to extend majority voting to fields that are,
even if only indirectly, sensitive with regard to their constitutional identities. In these circumstances, unanimity—as an expression of Member States’ mistrust towards one another—
should be considered a clue to identify possible constitutional
identity-sensitive areas, insofar as the Member States have
considered keeping control of the decisions taken by the Council in these fields.
Even though the Lisbon Treaty extended the QMV further,
unanimity is still required for many important decisions,255 for
example in several institutional matters,256 where Member
States agreed to govern unanimously on the development of
European institutions. Some of the decisions subject to the
unanimity rule are so crucial that it is hardly surprising to find
them on the list: this is valid for the accession of new members
in the European Club,257 for the Accession of the EU to the European Court of Human Rights,258 and for the authorization to
proceed with enhanced cooperation.259 To some extent, a similar justification lies behind the application of unanimity voting
for the adoption of a multiannual financial framework260 and
for decisions laying down the provisions relating to the system
of the Union’s own resources.261 Unanimity applies to those decisions that may affect the equality of Member States in European institutions,262 with a special regard to important symbols,263 and the use of languages in these institutions.264 In the
list of institutional matters subject to unanimity voting, we
find decisions that prove possibly problematic, such as the use

255. See Piris, supra note 139, at 5.
256. JEAN-CLAUDE PIRIS, THE LISBON TREATY: A LEGAL AND POLITICAL
ANALYSIS (2010).
257. Cf. Treaty of Lisbon art. 49.
258. Cf. id. art. 6(2); TFEU art. 218(8).
259. TFEU art. 329.
260. Id. art. 312(2).
261. Id. art. 311.
262. See TEU, supra note 7, art. 14(2) (requiring unanimity on decisions
regarding the composition of the European Parliament).
263. See TFEU art. 341 (requiring unanimity for decisions concerning the
seat of EU institutions).
264. Id. art. 342.
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of the flexibility clause265 and the conferral of jurisdiction on
the CJEU in certain disputes related to European intellectual
property rights.266
The most interesting suggestions come from the persistent
application of unanimity in substantive matters. A common
unanimous agreement in the Council is still required for: any
decision taken under the chapter on the common foreign and
security policy (Article 31 TEU) and the common security and
defense policy;267 the conclusion of certain types of international agreements; the negotiation and conclusion of agreements in
the fields of trade in services and the commercial aspects of intellectual property as well as foreign direct investment;268 any
decision concerning direct or indirect taxes;269 most of the
measures concerning social security, specifically social security
and social protection of workers, protection of workers where
their employment contract is terminated, representation and
collective defense of the interests of workers and employers,
and conditions of employment for third-country nationals legally residing in Union territory;270 any provision strengthening or
adding to the list of European citizenship’s rights;271 actions to
265. Id. art. 352.
266. Id. art. 262.
267. TEU, supra note 7, art. 42(2).
268. TFEU art. 207(4).
269. Id. art. 113, 192(2)(a),194(3).
270. Id. art. 153(2).
271. Id. art. 25. The list of citizenship’s right is provided by article 20(2)
TFEU, according to which citizens of the Union
shall have, inter alia: (a) the right to move and reside freely within
the territory of the Member States; (b) the right to vote and to stand
as candidates in elections to the European Parliament and in municipal elections in their Member State of residence, under the same
conditions as nationals of that State; (c) the right to enjoy, in the territory of a third country in which the Member State of which they
are nationals is not represented, the protection of the diplomatic and
consular authorities of any Member State on the same conditions as
the nationals of that State; [and] (d) the right to petition the European Parliament, to apply to the European Ombudsman, and to address the institutions and advisory bodies of the Union in any of the
Treaty languages and to obtain a reply in the same language.
In this respect, empirical evidence of the national concerns may already be
found in the Danish positions with regard to the Maastricht Treaty. Following the first Danish rejection of the Treaty of Maastricht, the so-called Edinburgh Agreement granted Denmark four exceptions. Section A of the “Heads
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combat discrimination based on sexual, racial, or ethnic origin,
religion or belief, disability, age, or sexual orientation;272 provisions primarily of a fiscal nature;273 some measures in the field
of protection of the environment274 and measures significantly
affecting a Member State’s choice between different energy
sources and the general structure of its energy supply;275
measures concerning family law with cross-border implications;276 any decision identifying aspects of criminal procedure
not expressly listed in the Treaties that may be the legal basis
to adopt directives facilitating mutual recognition of judgments
and judicial decisions and police and judicial cooperation in
criminal matters having a cross-border dimension;277 the establishment of a European public prosecutor;278 measures concerning operational cooperation between Members states’ police,
customs, and other specialized law enforcement services;279
provisions laying down the conditions and limitations under
which the Member States’ competent authorities (judiciary, poof State and Government, meeting within the European Council, concerning
certain problems raised by Denmark on the Treaty on European Union” stated that the provisions of part two of the EC Treaty (Citizenship of the Union’)
“do not in any way take the place of national citizenship. The question
whether an individual possesses the nationality of a Member State will be
settled solely by reference to the national law of the Member State concerned.” This position was reaffirmed in the “Unilateral declarations of Denmark.” With regard to the adoption of any provision to strengthen or to add
EU citizens’ rights, the Declaration stated that “[i]n Denmark, such adoption
will, in the case of a transfer or sovereignty, as defined in the Danish Constitution, require either a majority of 5/6 of Members of the Folketing or both a
majority of the Members of the Folketing and a majority of voters in a referendum.” For the text of both declarations, which are attached at the Conclusion of the Presidency of the European Council, see European Council in EdPARLIAMENT,
inburgh,
EUR.
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/edinburgh/default_en.htm (last visited Apr. 9, 2016).
272. TFEU art. 19(1).
273. Id. art. 192(2)(a).
274. Unanimity is required for measures affecting town and country planning, quantitative management of water resources or affecting, directly or
indirectly, the availability of those resources, and land use, with the exception of waste management. Id. art. 192(2)(a).
275. Id. art. 192(2)(c).
276. Id. art. 81(3).
277. Id. art. 82(3).
278. Id. art. 86(1).
279. Id. art. 87(3).
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lice, custom, and other specialized law enforcement services)
may operate in the territory of another Member State in liaison
and in agreement with the authorities of that State; and provisions concerning passports, identity cards, residence permits,
or any other such document.280
It is not hard to identify some leit-motiv in the substantive
matters where unanimity is still required, and therefore, a
higher degree of mutual mistrust between Member States still
persists. The rule of unanimity still expresses prudence and
caution in matters that are traditionally located in the core of
State sovereign powers: 1) foreign affairs and internal defense
and security; 2) taxation; 3) criminal law and procedure, including matters related to the monopoly of use of force and law
enforcement; and 4) citizenships’ rights and provisions directly
or indirectly connected with the status of citizen.
Besides these areas, which are traditionally linked to essential State sovereign powers, the list of matters where unanimity is still required consist of matters that are expressions of the
fundamental social dimension of the postwar constitutional
state, namely social security and nondiscrimination. Finally,
unanimity is required in possibly ethically-sensitive matters
like family law, particularly aspects related to protection of the
environment and energy policies, and certain aspects in the
field of property rights.
In the framework of social security matters, the unanimity
required by Article 154(2) 3rd subparagraph is not the only
point worthy of attention. According to another paragraph of
the same Article, provisions unanimously adopted in the field
of social security “shall not affect the right of Member States to
define the fundamental principles of their social security systems and must not significantly affect the financial equilibrium
thereof.”281
Finally, a twofold guarantee is provided in regard to the addition of new rights for EU citizens. In this matter, not only is
unanimity required, but the TEU also states that any provision
unanimously adopted, which strengthens or adds new rights
for EU citizens, shall enter into force after the “approval by the

280. Id. art. 77(3).
281. Id. art. 153(4).

562

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 41:2

Member States in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements.”282
Therefore, it could be argued that unanimity may serve as an
indicator of constitutional identity-sensitive matters, which are
better kept under unanimous control by Member States. However, this does not mean that every area where unanimity is
still being applied indicates a constitutional identity-sensitive
matter. Member States can decide to apply unanimity for a variety of reasons, regardless of any constitutional identityrelated concern. Furthermore, unanimity cannot be considered
as an ultimate guarantee of respect for Member States’ constitutional identity, or as an exclusive indicator of constitutional
identity-sensitive fields. Indeed, an automatic protection of
constitutional identity through the mere application of the rule
of unanimity may be excluded in two alternative scenarios: a)
the Council could unanimously adopt a decision violating the
constitutional identity of a Member State or b) constitutional
identity could be violated in one of the fields where QMV applies.
B. Enhanced Cooperation: Dribbling Through National Concerns?
Enhanced cooperation is another fragment of the European
mosaic that283 consisted of an overall tension, reaching its apex
around 1992, between a centripetal force of deeper supranational integration and a centrifugal national backlash. In short,
enhanced cooperation is an institutional arrangement that
makes possible for a certain number of Member States—but
not all—to further integrate their policies within the EU. Enhanced cooperation has been thought of as a tool to overcome
political deadlocks. Under certain conditions, Member States
that agree on a project of further integration may not be
282. Id. art. 25.
283. The adoption of the Treaty of Maastricht represented a decisive moment in the history of European integration, carrying ambivalent innovations. On the one hand, an ever closer EU was established through several
means: the introduction of a European citizenship, a deeper economic Union
and a monetary Union, and an ever closer political Union. On the other hand,
fears of Member States were tempered through the introduction of counterbalancing principles, such as the principle of respect of national identities
and the principle of subsidiarity. On the 1992 watershed for Europe, see supra Introduction.
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blocked by the substantial veto of Member States that do not
agree. These certain conditions have been changing under successive Treaty amendments, from the introduction of the first
set of rules in the Treaty of Amsterdam, to the regulatory
framework provided by the Treaty of Lisbon, currently in
force.284
According to the discipline currently in force, enhanced cooperation may be established in all sectors that do not fall within
the EU’s exclusive competence.285 At least nine Member States
are entitled to submit a request to the Commission, and the
Commission may submit a proposal to the Council. The latter
has the power to authorize proceedings with the proposal by
QMV, after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament.286 A slightly different procedure applies within the
framework of the common foreign and security policy.287 Leaving aside procedural details, enhanced cooperation is based on
two main pillars: the principle of transparency and the principle of openness. The former requires that all Member States’
representatives are authorized to sit in the Council meetings
where deliberations on enhanced cooperation shall be adopted.
Member States’ representatives that are not part of the relevant enhanced cooperation agreement are simply not entitled
to the right to vote on those matters.288
The principle of openness is implemented by Article 331
TFEU, which provides conditions for third parties to subsequently join established cooperation agreements. Significantly,
the competent authority on third party application is the
Commission and not the original member of the enhanced cooperation, with a sort of “appeal” to the Council, in case of a
rejection by the Commission.
Enhanced cooperation has initially been viewed suspiciously.
The Treaty of Amsterdam provided very strict rules289 that
284. TEU article 20 sets forth general provisions concerning the establishment of enhanced cooperation between a subset of Member States, whereas
detailed arrangements are provided by articles 326 to 334 TFEU.
285. TEU, supra note 7, art. 20.
286. TFEU art. 329(1).
287. TFEU art. 329(2).
288. TEU, supra note 7, art. 20(3); TFEU art. 330.
289. This was, at least, the position of a significant part of the legal scholarship. See, e.g., Claus Dieter Ehlermann, Differentiation, Flexibility, Closer Cooperation: The New Provisions of the Amsterdam Treaty, 4 EUR. L.J. 246, 269
(1998).
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have likely been the reason why the (then) closer (now enhanced) cooperation provisions have never applied. Rules have
been progressively softened, but traces of the original caution
toward enhanced cooperation are still present in the current
set of regulations. The Treaties spell out very clearly that enhanced cooperation may be adopted only as a last resort and
that it may not lead to a deviation in the integration process in
the EU, but shall rather “further the objectives of the Union,
protect its interest and reinforce its integration process.”290
Furthermore, enhanced cooperation “shall comply with the
Treaties and Union law” and “shall not undermine the internal
market or economic, social and territorial cohesion” nor shall it
“constitute a barrier to or discrimination in trade between
Member States, nor shall it distort competition between
them.”291
Despite the permanent subtle mistrust of enhanced cooperation, the new—and less complicated—set of procedural rules
introduced with the Treaty of Lisbon finally led to the first concrete experiences of enhanced cooperation. In 2012 and 2013
respectively, enhanced cooperation agreements on divorce law
and on unitary patent entered into force. It would be too much
a digression to focus on the details of these agreements.292 It is
enough to note that, in both cases, the agreements followed a
discussion of the projects at the European level, even though
each agreement is a different story. In both cases, reasons for a
comprehensive European regulation were self-evident: in the
case of the enhanced cooperation on divorce law, a significant
and constantly increasing number of nationally mixed families;293 in the case of the enhanced cooperation on unitary patent, the high cost of the preexisting system of inventions’ pro-

290. TEU, supra note 7, art. 20(1).
291. TFEU art. 326.
292. For further details, see, for example, Aude Fiorini, Harmonizing the
Law Applicable to Divorce and Legal Separation—Enhanced Cooperation as
the Way Forward?, 59 INT’L COMP. L.Q. 1143–58 (2010); Steve Peers, Divorce,
European Style: The First Authorization of Enhanced Cooperation, 6 EUR.
CONST. L. REV. 339 (2010); Enrico Bonadio, The EU Embraces Enhanced Cooperation in Patent Matters: Towards a Unitary Patent Protection System, 3
EUR. J. RISK REG. 416 (2011).
293. On this trend, see generally, for example, Giampaolo Lanzieri, Mixed
marriages in Europe, 1990-2010, in CROSS BORDER MARRIAGE: GLOBAL TRENDS
AND DIVERSITY 88 (Kim Doo-Sub ed., 2012).

2016] Taking Constitutional Identities Away from Courts

565

tection.294 Nevertheless, harsh disagreements on the policy to
adopt on these issues soon emerged. In the case of a European
regulation on family law, the disagreement had many facets,
and was based on very different approaches, traditions, and
domestic regulations in the matter of family law.295 A first proposal for a Council regulation was issued by the Commission in
2006.296 First, the proposal encountered the opt-out of Denmark
and the decision of the United Kingdom and Ireland not to participate in the measure. Second, the discussion on the single
policies made clear the remarkably different positions of various Member States on the matter. It has been reported that
Sweden was primarily responsible for the collapse of the negotiations, since they were not available to apply foreign divorce
rules that would possibly be less liberal than the domestic regulations in place.297
With regard to the project of a European Patent with unitary
effect, the disagreement did not break out on decisions on substantive policies, but on the prerequisite language.298 A common EU regulation establishing a Community patent had been
proposed in 2000.299 In the following years, political hurdles
and never-ending amendments to the Treaties’ provisions on
the legal basis made a decision on the proposal impossible. The
294. The system of European Patent of the European Patent Office, established by the European Patent Convention in 1973, consists of a mere sum of
the individual countries’ patents, requiring the validation in every single European country. This process is long and expensive, primarily because of
translation costs. Compared with the U.S. patent system, “it has been estimated that protecting an invention using the current EPO procedure in all
twenty-seven EU-Member States would cost applicants roughly €32,000, of
which €23,000 would be incurred for translation fees alone. On the other
hand, a US patent costs €1,850 on average.” See Bonadio, supra note 292, at
416.
295. Regulations may vary largely from Member State to Member State in
the area of family law. In some states, divorce is prohibited (Malta); in other
states, it is restrictively regulated (Poland); and in yet other states, such as
the Nordic States, regulations are inspired by much more liberal views.
296. See Commission Proposal for a Council Regulation Amending Regulation, 2201/2203, COM (2006) 399 final (July 17, 2006).
297. Fiorini, supra note 292, at 1144.
298. Before the enhanced cooperation adoption, the EU had been attempting to innovate this field for several decades. For an overview of that background, see generally Peers, supra note 292.
299. Commission Proposal for a Council Regulation on the Community Patent, COM (2000) 412 final (Aug. 1, 2000).
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discussion was relaunched in 2008–2009 after the adoption of
the Treaty of Lisbon,300 the Council reached an agreement on a
revised text of the EU patent regulation, providing terms and
conditions for obtaining a unitary patent right and its legal effects. Provisions on the delicate issue of translation—where
unanimity was required in the Council—had been left aside
from this agreement and were finally proposed by the Commission in June 2010. The model was linguistically inspired by the
European Patent Office (EPO) system: EU patent claims would
only have to be translated into one of the three EPO languages.301 On this proposal, where unanimity was needed,
Spain and Italy objected with a firm opposition, due to concerns
about the status of the Spanish and Italian language. This
deadlock was challenged by many Member States, which soon
suggested proceeding without Italy and Spain. The Commission proposed an enhanced cooperation agreement, which was
shortly afterward approved by the Council. All Member States
except Italy and Spain agreed to participate in this enhanced
cooperation.302

300. The Treaty of Lisbon conferred on the Union the explicit power “to establish measures for the creation of European intellectual property rights to
provide uniform protection of intellectual property rights throughout the Union and for the setting up of centralized Union-wide authorization, coordination and supervision arrangements.” TFEU Article 118 (in the formulation following the amendments to the TFEU provided by the Treaty of Lisbon). The delicate language issue was addressed in a specific paragraph. Article 118, para. 2, TFEU, provides that any rules to “establish language arrangements for the European intellectual property rights must be adopted by
a form of ‘special legislative procedure’,” requiring unanimity in the Council
and the consultation of the European Parliament. Id. art 118, para. 2.
301. More precisely, according to the Commission’s proposal, applications
not filed in English should have been translated into one of the other two
languages. During a transitional period of at most twelve years, patents filed
in French or German should have been translated into English, and patent
applications submitted in English should have been submitted into any official language of the participating Member State that is an EU official language.
302. Italy and Spain’s opposition also found a judicial follow-up. These
States submitted several complaints to the ECJ, challenging the authorization of enhanced cooperation and the subsequent measures implementing it.
All complaints have been so far dismissed by the Court. See Joined Cases C274/11 and C-295/11, Spain and Italy v. Council, [2013]; Case C-146/13,
Spain v. European Parliament & Council, [2015]; Cases C-147/13, Spain v.
Council, [2015].
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These first experiences in the fields of divorce law and European patent show that enhanced cooperation is a flexible
mechanism within EU architecture, which may be capable of
playing different and changing roles. It may not be excluded
that its application aims also at enacting a further step in the
integration process excluding one or more Member States, neutralizing possible conflicts with the domestic legal order. Enhanced cooperation usually stems out from EU projects that
initially comprised all Member States, and that found strong
opposition from a few Member States, expressing concerns that
are not shared by other Member States. These concerns may be
related to national features, constitutional values, and other
elements that can be easily traced back to the constitutional
identity of Member States not participating in the enhanced
cooperation. Experience garnered from the first two examples
of enhanced cooperation lead to subject matters that are usually connected with national constitutional identity, namely
family law and the protection of national language.
C. Subsidiarity
As previously mentioned, differentiated integration has always existed as a legal tool, by being able to accommodate special national interest in the European integration process.
Nonetheless, the Treaty of Maastricht offers good reasons to be
considered a turning point in this respect. A considerable widening of the EU competences has been balanced not only with
the introduction of the principle of respect of national identities, but also—and perhaps more significantly—with the principle of subsidiarity. This triangle—European integration, national identity, and subsidiarity—may be reasonably considered a unique picture, carrying new alternatives to the sovereignty narrative in the EU.303
Since its introduction in Treaties, subsidiarity has always
been a fundamental principle of EU law. Subsidiarity emerges
in another normative triangle picture in Article 5 TEU, beside
the principles of conferral and proportionality. In the current

303. Alejandro Saiz Arnaiz & Carina Alcoberro Llivinia, Why Constitutional
Identity Suddenly Matters: A Tale of Brave States, a Mighty Union and the
Decline of Sovereignty, in NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL IDENTITY AND EUROPEAN
INTEGRATION 1, 4 (2013).
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formulation, subsidiarity applies in areas of nonexclusive EU
competence and implies that
the Union shall act only if and in so far as the objectives of
the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the
Member States, either at central level or at regional and local
level, but can rather, by reason of the scale or effects of the
proposed action, be better achieved at Union level.304

The principle of subsidiarity has been mostly read as a “competence valve,” determining when the EU is competent to legislate, and aiming at displacing the regulation power as closely
as possible to the citizen. Nonetheless, subsidiarity bears an
extraordinary potential with regard to national constitutional
identities.
In this respect, recent studies have emphasized the versatile
role that the principle of subsidiarity may play in the EU. Some
of these studies have focused on the possible link between the
implementation of the principle and the legal duty to respect
national identities.305 This reinterpretation revealed interesting aspects of subsidiarity, and enlightened its possible application as a nonjudicial way to express concerns related to constitutional identity. Indeed the Protocol on the application of
the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality defines the
implementation of the principle and introduces several mechanisms to control and monitor its application. The Protocol was
first attached to the Treaty of Amsterdam and successively
amended by the Lisbon Treaty. The latter innovated these
mechanisms and strengthened the role of national Parliaments, which have the right to police subsidiarity through the
304. TEU, supra note 7, art. 5(3).
305. See Barbara Guastaferro, Coupling National Identity with Subsidiarity
Concerns in National Parliaments’ Reasoned Opinions, 21 MAASTRICHT J.
EUR. COMP. L. 320 (2014); Nicola Lupo, National Parliaments in the European Integration Process: Re-aligning Politics and Policies, in DEMOCRACY AND
SUBSIDIARITY IN THE EU: NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS, REGIONS AND CIVIL SOCIETY
IN THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS 107–132 (Marta Cartabia, Nicola Lupo, &
Andrea Simoncini eds., 2013); Marco Goldoni, The Early Warning System and
the Monti II Regulation: The Case for a Political Interpretation, 10 EUR.
CONST. L. REV. 90 (2014). An unexpected flexibility of the Principle of Subsidiarity and its implementation through the Early Warning System (“EWS”)
has already been proven. See generally PHILIPP KIIVER, THE EARLY WARNING
SYSTEM FOR THE PRINCIPLE OF SUBSIDIARITY: CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY AND
EMPIRICAL REALITY (2012).
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so-called “Early Warning System” (“EWS”).306 By virtue of the
procedure provided by the Subsidiarity Protocol, national Parliaments may send to the Presidents of the European Parliament, the Council, and the Commission a reasoned opinion
stating why it considers the draft in question not in compliance
with the subsidiarity principle.
If a “qualified minority” of the Member States’ Parliaments
acting together is met, a legislative draft proposed by the
Commission may be temporarily stopped by means of a socalled “yellow” or “orange card.”307 National Parliaments have
only carded twice so far, even though many reasoned opinions
have been raised.308 Simply put, the experience of the EWS still
seems to be open to a variety of purposes, and it may not be excluded that national Parliaments will use the principle of subsidiarity to raise concerns related to their constitutional identi-

306. On the role of national parliaments in the EWS, see KATARZYNA
GRANAT, NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS AND THE POLICING OF THE SUBSIDIARITY
PRINCIPLE (2014). With regard to the specific experience of the commission
proposal for an EU regulation on the right to strike, see Federico Fabbrini &
Katarzyna Granat, “Yellow card, but no foul”: The Role of the National Parliaments Under the Subsidiarity Protocol and the Commission Proposal for an
EU Regulation on the Right to Strike, 50 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 115–43
(2013).
307. The regulatory framework for “yellow” and “orange” cards is provided
by Protocol No. 2 annexed to the Treaty of Lisbon, on the Application of the
Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality. The qualified minority for a
“yellow card” consists of one third of the votes (a quarter in the area of JHA,
Article 7(2) of Protocol No. 2). An “orange card” is raised when more than half
of the national Parliaments oppose a legislative draft on grounds of subsidiarity (Article 7(3) of Protocol No. 2). In the first case, the Commission may decide to maintain, amend, or withdraw the legislative draft, being only obliged
to motivate its decision (Article 7(2) of Protocol No. 2). In case of the “orange
card,” the draft legislation must be reviewed and in case the Commission decides to maintain its proposal, it has to justify its decision with a reasoned
opinion. The Council, by a majority of 55 percent of its members, and the European Parliament shall decide on the basis of the Commission’s reasoned
opinion whether or not to adopt the act. The threshold is calculated by taking
into account the fact that each Parliament has two votes, and one vote is accorded to each chamber in the thirteen bicameral Parliament States (Article
7(3) of Protocol No. 2).
308. Annual Report on Relations Between the European Commission and
National Parliament, at 5 n.5, COM (2014) 507 final (Aug. 5, 2014); Annual
Report on Relations Between the European Commission and National Parliament, annex at 1 COM (2015) 316 final (July 2, 2015).

570

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 41:2

ties. Some empirical evidence has already been proven in the
above mentioned study.
Explicit references to Article 4(2) TEU may be found in the
Austrian Parliament’s reasoned opinion on the Commission
proposal on the award of concession contracts. The Commission
initiative was based on Article 114 TFEU, enabling the adoption of harmonization measures to ensure the functioning of
the internal market. Since the draft directive was also related
to services of general economic interest, the Austrian Parliament evoked in its reasoned opinion a number of Treaty provisions—and Article 4(2) was one of these—to emphasize the risk
of a compression of the flexibility granted to the Member States
in the area of services of general economic interest.309
Similar concerns were expressed in the reasoned opinion delivered by the German Bundesrat on the same proposal of the
Commission. The Bundesrat specially underlined the need to
safeguard local self-government when regulating the award of
service connection, with an explicit reference to Article 4(2)
TEU.310
With respect to the proposal for a directive on the award of
concession contracts, the two mentioned reasoned opinions
seem to interpret the flexibility clause in Article 4(2) TEU as a

309. Guastaferro, supra note 305, at 329.
310. The German Bundesrat expressed its concerns in regard to the creation of a general regulatory framework in the area of concessions of services,
referring in its passage to Article 4(2) TEU:
Durch den zum 1. Dezember 2009 in Kraft getretenen Vertrag von
Lissabon ist der Spielraum der EU, eine allgemeine Regelung für
Dienstleistungskonzessionen zu schaffen, die auch Kommunen betrifft, nochmals eingeschränkt worden. Denn die EU hat nach
Artikel 4 Absatz 2 Satz 1 EUV die jeweilige nationale Identität der
Mitgliedstaaten zu achten, die in ihren grundlegenden politischen
und verfassungsmäßigen Strukturen, einschließlich der regionalen
und lokalen Selbstverwaltung, zum Ausdruck kommt.
Beschluss des Budesrates: Vorschlag für eine Richtlinie des Europäischen
Parlaments unddes Rates über die Konzessionsvergabe [Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and Council Decision on the Award of
Concessions], COM (2011) 897 final (Mar. 2, 2012), translation at
http://www.bundesrat.de/SharedDocs/downloads/EN/uebersetzungen/087411ben.pdf;jsessionid=423994919C4BE400E86FDBC7CEA02A15.2_cid339?__blob
=publicationFile&v=1.
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safeguard of national autonomy.311 Conversely, two reasoned
opinions delivered by the Dutch and Swedish Parliaments on
the Commission’s proposal on the decree for the purpose of
providing common rules regarding the temporary reintroduction of border controls at internal borders in exceptional circumstances refer to Article 4(2) in a much vaguer sense. These
opinions interpret the Identity Clause as a provision protecting
national competences, such as national security. The Dutch
Parliament referred to Article 4(2) in connection with other
provisions of TEU and TFEU, with the aim of challenging the
legal basis of the Commission proposal.312 Similarly, the Swedish Parliament assumed that the Commission’s proposal of
providing new rules regarding the temporary reintroduction of
border controls affected national security and the maintenance
of law and order.313 In the view of the Swedish Parliament,
these matters should remain under the responsibility of each
Member State, by virtue of Article 72 TFEU and Article 4(2)
TEU.314
In summation, national Parliaments started to use their
power to have a say in the legislative process of the EU
through the use of the principle of subsidiarity.315 In this re311. Guastaferro, supra note 305, at 332.
312. Reasoned Opinion (Subsidiary) On the Decree for the Purpose of
Providing Common Rules Regarding the Temporary Reintroduction of Border
Controls at Internal Borders in Exceptional Circumstances, COM (2011) 560
(Nov. 8, 2011).
313. See Reasoned Opinion of the Riksdag, 2011/2012:JuU13 (Swed.), unofficial
translation
at
http://www.ipex.eu/IPEXLWEB/scrutiny/COD20110242/serik.do; Committee on Justice 2011, Proposal
for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council Amending
Regulation (ec) No. 562/2006 in Order to Provide for Common Rules on the
Temporary Reintroduction of Border Control at Internal Borders in Exceptional
Circumstances
(Swed.),
http://www.ipex.eu/IPEXLWEB/scrutiny/COD20110242/serik.do.
314. Id.
315. Every national parliament is indeed “free to interpret the functions
conferred upon it by EU law in the manner which it retain to be the most
beneficial,” by virtue of the political nature of national parliaments. Lupo,
supra note 305, at 127. That being said, it comes as no surprise that
the way in which the early warning mechanism develops in each national parliament tends to be influenced, to some degree, by its national characteristics, by its political and institutional culture [ . . . ],
by the configuration of the parliamentary groups and committees, as
well as the influence of the parliamentary bureaucracy. All these el-
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spect, some Parliaments made use of Article 4(2) as a valid
means of objecting on the basis of identity-related concerns.

CONCLUSION
As previously evidenced, a vast amount of legal scholarship
has been devoted to the analysis of constitutional identity.
Most of the literature has adopted a court-centric canon of interpretation, even though the judicial epiphanies of the notion
are extremely rare at the EU-law level and often ambiguous in
the case law of the Member States’ constitutional courts. The
combination of these two aspects—a shortage of judicial material and vagueness of the concept—has been the starting point
to embark on a nonjudicial investigation of constitutional identity. At the present stage of the analysis, it is time to reassemble the collected fragments of this highly controversial notion.
Elements of the judicial understanding of constitutional identity were collected in Part I. In Part II, an analysis of methods of
nonjudicial neutralization of identity-related conflicts was undertaken. Part III analyzed three possible indicators of constitutional identity-sensitive matters: a) national interests underpinning the nonparticipation of certain Member States in enhanced cooperation agreements; b) matters where the unanimity rule still applies; and c) references to constitutional identity
in national Parliaments’ reasoned opinions.
If these fragments of the constitutional-identity patchwork
are put together, a surprisingly coherent framework emerges.
By comparing the list of constitutional identity-sensitive matters that the BVerfG compiled in its Lissabon-Urteil with the
substantive matters involved in the illustrated opt-outs, exemptions, and protocols, remarkable overlaps emerge. Member
States and the EU are struggling widely on the same matters
both in and out of European and national constitutional courts.
Among highly considered national interests, many elements
recur. First, the decision of family law emerges multiple times
in the Lissabon-Urteil list,316 in one of the enhanced cooperation agreements,317 in the Irish guarantees,318 and behind the
ements can be easily traced back to the constitutional identity of
each Member State.
Id. at 132.
316. See supra Part I.
317. See supra Part III.
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Polish quasi-opt-out from the CFREU.319 Second, the general
consideration of the protection of the welfare state emerges
several times, in the Lissabon-Urteil, in the decision of the
Polish Constitutional Court on the Lisbon Treaty, and in more
than one reasoned opinion of the national Parliaments.320
Third, the form of State emerges in the CJEU’s case law321 and
in a more specific declination, comprising local selfgovernment, in one reasoned opinion of the German Budesrat.322 Fourth, peculiar national concerns regarding foreign and
military policy underpin a part of the Irish guarantees323 and
the Danish opt-out from decisions with defense implications,
which are not specifically addressed in this article. Fifth,
among national constitutional identity concerns, a recurrent
element is the protection of the national language.324 Sixth, fiscal autonomy emerges as part of constitutional identity in the
Lissabon-Urteil list and in the Irish Protocol on the Lisbon
Treaty.325 Lastly, overlapping concerns may be found in the
BVerfG inclusion among the constitutional identity-sensitive
matters of fundamental decisions on substantive and formal
criminal law and on the use of force by the police. The significant opt-outs in the field of the AFSJ confirm the inclination of
certain Member States to retain the highest possible level of
autonomy in these areas.326
Most of the matters that result in constitutional identitysensitive concerns are comprised in the traditional understanding of essential State functions, such as the ability to shape social conditions including family regulation, protection of the
national language, form of the State, fiscal autonomy, defense
and military policy, criminal law, and monopoly of the use of
force. Less obvious is the fact that greatly overlapping claims to
retain a high grade of national autonomy have been managed
318. See supra Part II.
319. See supra Part II.
320. See supra Part III.
321. See supra Part I.
322. See supra Part III.
323. See supra Part II.
324. The CJEU’s case law concerning the use of national languages and
name spelling requirements is addressed in supra Part I. The reasons behind
the nonparticipation of Italy and Spain in the European Patent with Unitary
Effect are discussed in Part III, supra.
325. See supra Part II.
326. See supra Part II.
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in very different manners throughout the latest developments
of the European integration.
In some cases, these claims have been left to judicial struggle.
In others, they have been managed through a previous political
neutralization by means of opt-outs, protocols, declarations,
and other political guarantees. Judicial struggles with identityrelated cases often yield possible disastrous outcomes, whereas
the accommodation of highly considered national interests
through differentiated integration did not result in the dissolution of the Union. Therefore, a less timid use of the latter
seems to be highly recommended.
Indeed, the judicial monopoly of the interpretation of national
constitutional identity issues did not clarify the notion of national constitutional identity and seems inefficient in terms of
avoiding dangerous outcomes. The so-called judicial dialogue
proved to be more of a judicial fight. Such dialogue seems highly unfit as a method of settlement for ultimate constitutional
disputes. Under these circumstances, other methods need to be
developed, both conceptually and practically. This article argues that differentiated integration is already one of the alternative methods that needs to be further developed.
Indeed, in particular after 1992, the outbreak of identity issues in the EU had been accompanied by a parallel growth of
differentiated integration, both in theory and in practice. This
article argues that these two trends should be seen as closely
linked to each other. According to a coordinated view of identity
and differentiated integration, Article 4(2) TEU may be interpreted in the sense that it establishes a legal duty for the EU
and Member States to neutralize any possible conflict before it
breaks out by using opt-outs, interpretative declarations, exemptions, and any other suitable means. The respect of national identities spelled out in Article 4(2) TEU, includes a duty to
differentiate as long as differentiation prevents a violation of
constitutional identity.
What if things go wrong? What if a differentiated integration
would have successfully neutralized an infringement of a peculiar character of the constitutional identity of Member States,
but none of the actors entitled to negotiate such an arrangement acted? In other words, if Article 4(2) imposes a legal duty
to accommodate national constitutional identity claims through
differentiated integration arrangements, what is the chosen
sanction in case of breach of this duty?
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It is highly implausible for the CJEU to impose the introduction of a mechanism of differentiated integration, even if the
latter would solve the legal problem. This does not mean that
Article 4(2) provides a differentiation duty with no sanction.
The point is that the sanction in question is not applicable by
the CJEU or by any national constitutional court.
In fact, an applicable sanction exists and consists of the accommodation of the disagreement outside of the EU framework. If a strong resistance from a limited number of Member
States impedes an agreement on a certain matter, and no tool
of flexibility is put into effect to accommodate these reluctances
in the EU framework, under certain circumstances a Member
State’s avant-garde may seek out international law.
This seems to be the picture that emerged with the Treaty on
Stability, Coordination, and Governance (TSCG):327 all of its
parties are Member States of the EU; the only Member States
that did not sign the Treaty were the United Kingdom and
Czech Republic (Croatia was not a Member of the Union yet).
The TSCG introduced new stringent forms of budgetary surveillance in (and over) the current euro zone, improving the
monitoring, surveillance, and coordination of economic policies
and providing enforcement measures to correct excessive macroeconomic imbalances. The procedures laid down in the TSCG
involve a fundamental role of the European institutions.328 The
TSCG sets some specific targets for the signatory countries
that, in short, may be summarized as follows: to achieve a balanced (or in surplus) budget, to avoid an excessive government
deficit, and to correct macroeconomic imbalances. Even though
the TSCG provides rules on stability, coordination, and govern327. Formally the Treaty on Stability, Coordination, and Governance in the
Economic and Monetary Union, 2013 O.J. was signed on March 2, 2012 by all
Member States except for the Czech Republic and the United Kingdom. Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary
Union, Mar. 2, 2012 [hereinafter TSCG], http://europa.eu/rapid/pressrelease_DOC-12-2_en.htm
328. Each part of the Treaty submits a stability program to the Economic
and Financial Affairs Council and the Commission and sets a “medium-term
budgetary objective” to be assessed by the Council. For a concise analysis of
the Treaty in relation to both the authentic enhanced cooperation model and
the threat of disintegration, see Carlo Maria Cantore & Giuseppe Martinico,
Asymmetry or Dis-integration? A few considerations on the new “Treaty on
Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union,” 19 EUR. PUB. L. 463 (2013).
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ance in the EMU,329 its application extends to Members States
that benefit from a permanent de jure opt-out (Denmark), a de
facto opt-out (Sweden), and to “Member States with a derogation.”330
In summary, the Stability Treaty looks more like an EU
Treaty with the opt-out of the United Kingdom and Czech Republic than an international agreement between most of the
EU-Member States.331 However, there is one significant difference, an international treaty enjoys the protection from referendum that is usually granted to diplomatic acts.332 This is not
a small difference, in particular after the referendum fears that
followed the French and Dutch “No” to the CT in 2005 and the
Irish “No” to the Lisbon Treaty in 2008.
Once again, this scenario supports the idea that the judicial
monopoly on national constitutional identity through the myth
of the so-called judicial dialogue is an unsuitable institutional
arrangement. Moreover, it draws a rather dangerous picture.
These are sufficient reasons to argue in favor of a need to reform these inappropriate institutional arrangements. Such
prospects for reform are far from being new in the European
329. The TSCG states,
This Treaty shall apply to the Contracting Parties with a derogation,
as defined in Article 139(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union, or with an exemption, as referred to in Protocol (No
16) on certain provisions related to Denmark annexed to the European Union Treaties, which have ratified this Treaty, as from the
date when the decision abrogating that derogation or exemption
takes effect, unless the Contracting Party concerned declares its intention to be bound at an earlier date by all or part of the provisions
in Titles III and IV of this Treaty.
TSCG, supra note 327, art. 14(5).
330. Member States with a derogation are those Member States that have
not adopted the euro yet, but are legally obliged to do so as soon as they meet
the requirements.
331. The so-called Fiscal Compact provides the obligation to codify the
budget rule in national law “through provisions of binding force and permanent character, preferably constitutional, or otherwise guaranteed to be fully
respected and adhered to.” This provision has been criticized as excessively
intrusive on the national State constitutional autonomy, and its compatibility
with the EU law principle of respect for the national identity and constitutional structure of EU-Member States has been questioned. Cantore and
Martinico, supra note 328, at 464–65.
332. Majone, supra note 137, at 246, 247.
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debate.333 From the “Constitutional Council”334 to the “European Conflicts Tribunal,”335 there is a relevant common denominator in many of the reform proposals of the Union, namely the
awareness of the present inadequacy of the given judicial system of resolution of “ultimate conflicts” between the supranational and the national level.336
A promising starting point for any proposal should be the
awareness that “not all legal problems can be solved legally.”337
Conflicts related to constitutional identity certainly belong to
the category of legal problems that will likely not be solved legally. That being said, the proposed model of a European Conflicts Tribunal could have a successful impact not only with respect to conflicts between EU and Member State competences,
but also with respect to national constitutional identity-related
issues. Lindseth’s proposal is based on the above mentioned
MacCormick admonition. In a nutshell, the Tribunal should be
comprised of judges from supreme and constitutional courts
and presided over by the president of the CJEU. The Tribunal
should have competence a) on norm control upon reference by a
Member State or an EU institution and b) on conflicts of jurisdiction submitted by national courts or individual litigants, as
long as all other available legal remedies have been exhausted.
As far as constitutional identity-related conflicts are concerned, the most promising aspect relies upon the proposed ad333. The debate exploded around the turn of the century. See, e.g., Franz C
Mayer, Die drei Dimensionen der Europäischen Kompetenzdebatte, 61 Z. FÜR
AUSLÄNDISCHES ÖFFENTL. RECHT VÖLKERR. ZAÖRV Z. FÜR AUSLÄNDISCHES
ÖFFENTL. RECHT VÖLKERR. 577–638 (2001).
334. Joseph H.H. Weiler & Ulrich R. Haltern, The Autonomy of the Community Legal Order-Through the Looking Glass, 37 HARV. INT’L L.J. 411
(1996).
335. Lindseth, supra note 14, at 726.
336. As a matter of fact,
the ECJ Is an EU institution and has often been depicted as a major
engine of the European integration process. The Court might therefore be expected to be more receptive to integration-based arguments. Secondly it cannot be excluded that the Court may not feel
very comfortable with certain identity-related arguments, especially
if they are inspired by national aims which are not, as such, shared
by the EU.
CLOOTS, supra note 6, at 211.
337. Neil MacCormick, The Maastricht-Urteil: Sovereignty Now, 1 EUR. L. J.
259, 265 (1995).
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ditional political safeguards, to be guaranteed to Member
States dissatisfied with a ruling of the Conflicts Tribunal. In
these cases, the Tribunal should refer the matter to the European Council for consideration. As a last option, in the case
that a Member State is dissatisfied with the Conflicts Tribunal
ruling and cannot find any political arrangement in the European Council, that Member State should be allowed to opt-out
of the legislation incompatible with its constitutional identity.338

338. In the same sense, see Lindseth, supra note 14, at 732.

